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RULES OF REGULARITY: AN EMPIRICAL QUEST
FOR COMMERCIAL CERTAINTY IN ARBITRATION
CORNELIS

J.W. BAAIJ*

ABSTRACT

The U.S. Supreme Court justifies the broad enforceability
of arbitration agreements with the notion that arbitration expands
parties' autonomy to contract for an efficient alternative to court
proceedings. Unfortunately, the current practice of both domestic
and cross-border commercial arbitration does not fully live up to
these expectations. It is crucial to both autonomy and efficiency theories of contract law that adjudicatory decision-making is predictable so parties can tailor their contracts accordingly. However,
commercial arbitration's prevailing culture of confidentiality and
lack of stare decisis diminishes commercial certainty. To bring the
reality of commercial arbitration closer to the Supreme Court's
reasoning, this Article proposes a method of empirical legal research
that helps uncover patterns of arbitral decision-making and articulate arbitration's "rules of regularity." It also offers a proof of
concept by presenting an original quantitative text analysis of unpublished arbitral awards from the International Court of Arbitration, which focuses on the arbitral assessment of compensatory
damages in breach-of-contract disputes. That study uncovers three
substantive and procedural rules of regularity, which future transactors can accept or contract around when negotiating damages
and arbitration clauses.
' Cornelia J.W. Baaij, J.S.D. (Yale, 2018), Associate Professor at Utrecht Law

School. The author is grateful to William Eskridge, Jr., Ian Ayres, Steve Ware,

Victor Goldberg, Alan Schwartz, Daniel Markovits, Larry Solan, Alec Stone Sweet,
and Loukas Mi.steiis for their helpful comments during discussions on the subject matter or their feedback on earlier drafts. This Article further benefited
significantly from comments received at the QUSL Center on Dispute Resolution's Works-in-Progress Consortium on January 29, 2021; the ICC International Court of Arbitration Webinar on Damages in International Arbitration
on December 10, 2020; and the Empirical Methods in Legal Research series on
Quantitative Case Law Analysis at Leiden Law School on October 26, 2020.
All errors are those of the author.
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INTRODUCTION

Over time, the U.S. Supreme Court has offered an increasingly broad interpretation of the 1926 Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA').! The Court's position that arbitration agreements should
be enforced "pretty absolutely" is premised on arbitration's autonomy and efficiency-enhancing capabilities.2 In its reasoning,
the Court has expressed confidence that arbitration increases the
parties' control of how their contract disputes are resolved and
promotes arbitration as a more efficient yet equally effective alternative to court proceedings. 3
However, the current practice of domestic and cross-border
commercial arbitration does not fully live up to the Court's promise
of contractual autonomy and efficiency.4 Unlike litigation, commercial arbitration's prevailing culture of confidentiality and a
lack of stare decisis renders arbitral decision-making less transparent and predictable than judicial precedent. 5 While arbitration
allows participants considerable leeway to determine both the substantive and procedural rules of arbitration, in effect, the parties'
control is reduced if it is difficult for the parties to assess how arbitrators will apply these rules. 6 In other words, a lack of commercial certainty in commercial arbitration advances neither the
parties' contractual autonomy nor their ability to realize optimal
contractual efficiency. 7
See infra notes 41-57. The Act entered into force on January 1, 1926, as
the ''United States Arbitration Act," now called the "Federal Arbitration Act''
("FAA''). See 9 U.S. C.§ 14. For the Act's text, see 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
• See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1621 (2018).
• See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011) (''The
point of affording parties discretion in designing arbitration processes is to allow
for efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute.''); see also
infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
• See infra Section I.A.
5 See infra Section II.A.
6 See infra notes 54-56, 163 and accompanying text.
7 See Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and
the Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 UNN. PA. L. REV. 533, 562
(1998) (discussing commercial certainty enabling ''parties to predict the promises
that courts will enforce," in relation to the parol evidence rule in contract interpretation); Agasha Mugasha, Evolving Standards of Conduct (Fiduciary Duty,
Good Faith and Reasonableness) and Commercial Certainty in Multi-Lender
Contracts, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 1789, 1818 (2000) (explaining commercial certainty
1
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This Article proposes a method of empirical legal research

to improve the predictability of arbitral decision-making and bring
the reality of commercial arbitration closer to the Supreme Court's

reasoning underlying its application of the FAA.B The Article
shows that a quantitative text analysis of unpublished arbitral
awards can uncover patterns of arbitral decision-making and articulate what it will call "rules of regularity.''9 These rules of regularity can help transactors decide whether to contract out of patterns of arbitral decision-making.lO The Article will demonstrate
the proposed method's potential by presenting a proof of concept
analyzing how arbitrators in cross-border commercial arbitration
calculate the amount of compensatory damages in breach-ofcontract disputes.ll
The method developed in this Article fllls a knowledge gap
in both contract and arbitration law scholarship and offers valuable insights for legal practitioners.12 For example, while scholars
of political science and empirical legal studies have generated extensive quantitative case law analyses,13 these projects tend not to
include arbitral decisions.1 4 Moreover, surveys that analyze the

in terms of contractual freedom requiring courts to apply the rules chosen by
the parties in a preclictable manner).
• See infra Section !II.B.
• See infra Sections III.C-III.D.
10 See infra Part III; Mugasha, supra note 7, at 1817-18.
" See infra Part III.
12 See infra notes 13--16 and accompanying text.
'" See Carolyn Shapiro, Coding Complexity: Bringing Law to the Empirical
Analysis of the Supreme Court, 60 HAsTINGSL.J. 477,477,479 (2009) [hereinafter Coding Complexity] (seeking to improve empirical studies of U.S. Supreme
Court opjnions); see also Jason J. Czarnezki, An Empirical Investigation of Judicial Decisionmaking, Statutory Interpretation, and the Chevron Doctrine in Environmental Law, 79 UNlV. CoLO. L. REV. 767, 769, 784 (2008) (concentrating
on the influence of ideological and other variables in statutory interpretation
in the field of environmental law); Pauline T. Kim et a!., How Should We Study
District Judge Decision-Making?, 29 WASH. UNlV. J.L. & POL'y 83, 83, 85 (2009)
(focusing on the specific characteristics of judicial decision-making in trial level
litigation); Gregory C. Sisk et a!., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind:
An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1382--83
(1998). For a review of the potential limitations of empirical studies of judicial
decision-making, see Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical
Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 2002
UNlV. ILL. L. REV. 819, 820, 849--50 (2002).
14 For an exception, see Stephanie E. Keer & Richard W. Naimark, Arbitrators Do Not "Split the Baby':· Empirical Evidence from International Business
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valuation of damages in arbitration empirically tend focus on investment and not commercial arbitration, 15 while empirical studies
on cross-border commercial arbitration are often qualitative rather
than quantitative.16 Additionally, while arbitration scholars and
practitioners have argued that a lack of transparency and stare
decisis in commercial arbitration might hurt the legitimacy and
reputation of arbitration institutions, commentators have overlooked the adverse effects on commercial certainty.17
Arbitrations, in ToWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARilrrRATION: COLLECTED
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 311, 311 (Christopher R. Drahozal & Richard W. Nall:nark
eds., 2005). For a 2005 survey of AAA awards that involved an empirical analysis
of fifty-four cases based on surveys, see id. at 312.
15 Cf. Susan D. Franck, Empiricism and International Law: Insights for
Investment Treaty Dispute Resolution, 48 VA. J. INT'L L. 767, 774, 793 (2008)
(making the case for empirical studies of investment treaty disputes); PR!CEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2015--lNTERNATIONAL ARilrrRATION DAMAGES RESEARCH
1, 4 (2015) [hereinafter PwC RESEARCH 2015] (for research with a sample focused
upon investment treaty arbitration); PR!CEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, PwC INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION DAMAGES RESEARCH: 2017 UPDATE 1 n.1 (Dec. 2017) (for
research that mainly reviewed awards from arbitrations of investment treaties).
16 See PwC RESEARCH 2015, supra note 15, at 4 (stating that commercial
arbitration awards, relative to investment arbitration rewards, have been made
less available to the public). For the most prominent and influential qualitative
works on private arbitration and its role in private governance of the marketplace, also see Yves Derains, New Trends in the PracticoJ, Application of ICC Rules
of Arbitration, 3 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 39, 39-40, 55 (1981) (being an example of
a qualitative study); HERFRIED WbSS ET AL., DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION UNDER COMPLEX LoNG·TERM CONTRACTS 3.155--56 (1st ed. 2014);
John A Trenor, Strategic Issues in Employing and Deploying Damages Experts,
in GUIDE TO DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL ARilrrRATION 136 (John A Trenor ed.,
2018). See generally Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115
(1992); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV.
1724 (2001) [hereinafter Private Commercial Law].
17 Cindy G. Buys, The Tensions between Confidentiality and Transparency
in International Arbitration, 14 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 121, 135 (2003) (linking
greater transparency in arbitration with an increase in the legitimacy of the
use of international arbitration generally); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Toward
a Theory of Precedent in Arbitration, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1895, 1901 (2010)
(observing a form of arbitral precedent to the extent that "awards have some
observable relevance to the future conduct of system participants'1; Myriam
Gilles, The Day Doctrine Died: Private Arbitration and the End of Law, 2016
UN!V. ILL. L. REV. 371, 422 (critiquing arbitration's ''wholesale removal of entire
categories of cases from the public judicial system").
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Part I shows that the principles of contractual autonomy
and contractual efficiency that underpin the U.S. Supreme Court's
broad application of the FAA expect more from commercial arbitration than it currently delivers.lB The reason is that transparency
of adjudicatory decision-making is essential to the autonomy-based
and efficiency-based theories of contract law that support the
Court's reasoning. 19 The need for predictability will be shown by
explaining why both kinds of theories call for contract default
rules that are predictable for contract parties ex ante-that is,
in advance of negotiating, drafting, and concluding contracts. 20
Default rules only apply to contracts when the parties have not
included a term to the contrary.2 1 Hence, both contractual autonomy and contractual efficiency require predictable default rules,
so future transactors have an opportunity to decide for themselves
whether it is best to accept or contract around these default terms.22
Hence, uncertainty as to which such malleable rules will be applied
in which manner by adjudicators diminishes the parties' autonomy and the opportunity for them to negotiate the most efficient
terms. 23 In much the same way, if arbitral decision-making is difficult to predict by transactors in advance, commercial arbitration advances neither autonomy nor efficiency optimally. 24 In that
case, arbitration does not fully live up to the expectations underpinning the Supreme Court's case law on the enforceability of
arbitration agreements.25
1s See infra Part I.

See infra notes 54-55, 134-39 and accompanying text.
See infra Section I.C.
21 Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual
Consent, VA. L. REV. 821,825 (1992) [hereinafter Sound of Silence].
22 See id. at 821-22, 825 (discussing the difference between a default rule
and an immutable rule).
23 Cf Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller, Why Autonomy Must be Contract's
Ultimate Value, 20 JER. REv. LEGAL STUD. 148, 166 (2019) [hereinafter Ultimate
Value] (stating that predictability is related to a contract's party's autonomy);
C. A Riley, Designing Default Rules in Contract: Consent, Conventionalism, and
Efficiency, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 367, 385-86 (2000) (discussing efficient
defaults and parties knowing of them).
24 See infra Section II.A; see also Rent-A-Center, W., Inc., v. Jackson, 561
u.s. 63, 67 (2010).
26 See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
19

2o
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Part II will explain how empirical legal studies can mitigate
the lack of commercial certainty in domestic and cross-border commercial arbitration.26 Part II argues that this solution is particularly beneficial for the predictability of arbitral decision-making
on questions of fact such as the calculation of compensatory damages
in breach-of-contract cases.27 Unlike questions of law, questions
of fact tend not to be resolved by applying the substantive contract law chosen by the parties. 28 Hence, even assuming arbitrators follow judicial precedent no different from domestic courts, the
governing law does not supply commercial certainty on matters
left to the arbitrators' discretion.29 Of all factual questions, perhaps
the most important ones relate to the calculation of the amount,
or quantum, of damages in breach-of-contract cases.ao The reason is that most contract disputes will at least involve claims for
monetary relief.31 Hence, conveying a reliable account through empirical studies of how arbitrators calculate damages offers valuable
insights for businesses and their attorneys as well as arbitrators,
scholars, and students alike.a2
Part III offers a proof of concept by presenting an original
quantitative text analysis of four years of unpublished arbitral
awards made available by the International Chamber of Commerce
Court of Arbitration (''International Court of Arbitration," or ''ICC
Court"), the leading commercial arbitration center in the world.aa
Indeed, cross-border commercial arbitration has become a valued
alternative to international litigation by American businesses34
See infra Section II. C.
See infra notes 185--88, 212--26 and accompanying text.
28 Compare Question of Fact, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., https:/1
www.law.cornell.edu/wex/question_of_fact [https://perma.cc/8S3U-SHA6], with
Question of Law, CORNELL L. SCH. LEGAL INFO. INST., https:/lwww.law.cornell
.edu/wex!question_of_law [https://perma.cc/UXT4-J3RT].
29 See infra notes 199--204 and accompanying text.
ao See infra notes 199--204 and accompanying text.
31 See Robert M. Lloyd, Contract Damages in Tennessee, 69 TENN. L. REV.
837, 838 (2002).
32 See Buys, supra note 17, at 136.
88 See infra note 239 and accompanying text; ICC International Court of
Arbitration, INT'L CHAMBER COM., https://iccwbo.org/dispute·resolution·ser
vices/icc-international-court·arbitrationl [https://perma.cc/8V42·9WEM].
84 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERClAL ARBITRATION 156, n.l125
(3rd ed. 2020) (underscoring that in 2017, 9.5% of ICC arbitrations involved
U.S. claimants, "the highest proportion of any nation''); see also Mitsubishi
2s
27
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ever since the volume and value of U.S. international trade con·
tinued to grow since the 1960s.35 This quantitative analysis uses
descriptive statistics and inferential factor analysis with co·
occurrence matrixes. These analyses uncover three patterns of
arbitral decision-making on the quantum of damages,36 namely
that, unless the parties agree otherwise, arbitrators are more likely
to award a higher percentage of the claim in case of reliance damages than expectation damages; sole arbitrators are more likely
to award a higher percentage than three-person panels; and the
claimant's advantage in engaging a quantum expert depends on
whether the other party also retains one. As a result, future
transactors can consider these rules of regularity when negotiating and drafting damages and arbitration clauses.37
The Article concludes by indicating which kind of research
is needed to go from articulating individual rules of regularity to
a more comprehensive account of arbitral decision-making that
may prompt a practice of arbitral stare decisis.3B

I. AUTONOMY, EFFICIENCY, AND PREDICTABILITY
A. The Court's Reliance on Contractual Autonomy and Efficiency

An analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court's arbitration case
law reveals two central features of the Court's precedent. First, the
Court has continually reduced the scope of judicial review of arbitration while broadening the applicability of the FAA. 39 Second,
it has done so by consistently appealing to two central principles of
contract law: contractual autonomy and contractual efficiency. 40
First, the Court's application and interpretation of the
FAA have gradually grown expansive over time. As to the scope
of application, the FAA's language, strictly interpreted, limits the
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638 (1985) ("As
international trade has expanded in recent decades, so too has the use of in·
ternational arbitration to resolve disputes arising in the course of that trade.').
35 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. TRADE IN GoODS AND SERVICE&-BALANCE
OF PAYMENTS (BOP) BASIS 1.

See infra Sections III.C-III.D.
See infra Conclusions and Recommendations.
See infra Conclusions and Recommendations.
39 See infra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
40 See infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
36

37
88
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judicial enforceability of arbitration agreements to maritime and
commercial transactions. 41 However, the Court has come to read
the Act's scope to include labor, 42 securities, 43 and antitrust arbitration,44 as well as arbitration between companies and noncommercial parties such as consumers45 and employees, 46 including
Title VII complaints.47 In terms of the interpretation of the FAA's
substantive rules, the Court has also shown a propensity to enforce arbitration agreements ''pretty absolutely,'' as Justice Gorsuch
wrote for the Court in 2018.48 The Court developed doctrines that
place an increasingly heavy burden of proof on the party resisting
arbitration in court. In doing so, the Court reduces the scope of
41 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018) ("A written provision in any maritime transaction or
a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitra·
tion a controversy ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.").
42 United Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567~8 (1960) (confirming
the arbitrability of labor disputes).
48 Scherk v. Alberto·Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 513--14, 519--20 (1974) (ex·
panding the substantive statutory rights arbitrable under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,
480--81 (1989) (expanding the rights arbitrable under the Securities Act of 1933).
«See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler·Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 631, 638--39 (1985) (holding that both international and domestic anti·
trust claims are arbitrable).
45 See, e.g., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 577 U.S. 47, 50-51, 58-59 (2015)
(enforcing arbitration clauses containing a waiver of class action in a consumer
service agreement).
46 Cir. City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001) (extending the scope of
the FM to encompass employment agreements); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23, 35 (1991).
47 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 251, 256--58 (2009) (expand·
ing the rights arbitrable under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 ("ADEA'')). For a critique of the Supreme Court's liberal interpretation
of the statutory language, see Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1643
(2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) C'Congress never endorsed a
policy favoring arbitration where one party sets the terms of an agreement while
the other is left to 'take it or leave it."); Martin H. Malin, The Three Phases of the
Supreme Court's Arbitration Jurisprudence: Empowering the Already·Empowered,
17 NEV. L.J. 23, 26--27 (2016); Craig Smith & Eric V. Moye, Outsourcing American
Civil Justice: Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Employment Contracts, 44 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 281, 282--83 (2012); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping
Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1634-35 (2005).
48 Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1621.
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judicial review by establishing the arbitrator's presumptive competence to determine whether the parties had consented to arbitrate
the competency question. 49 The Court has further held that its
broad interpretation of the FAA applies even stronger to crossborder commercial arbitration between American business and
foreign contracting partners. 50 It reasoned that expeditious enforcement of arbitration agreements and arbitral awards helps
American companies take advantage of the growth of global trade
and commerce as well as expand business abroad. 51
Second, the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that its liberal
reading of the FAA is based on two foundational principles of contract law: contractual autonomy and contractual efficiency.52 As will
be discussed in more detail next, according to the autonomy principle, the state should respect individual autonomy and enforce contractual obligations that individuals took on freely and willingly;
the efficiency principle rests on the notion that the enforcement of
contracts facilitates optimal efficiency in transactions. 53 Alluding
•• These doctrines involve the so-called "arbitrability of arbitrability," the
"severability rule," and a restrictive interpretation of the "saving clause" of 9
U.S. C. § 2. Previous articles by this author have argued in detail why these
doctrines risk infringing the principle ofliberal justice in political theory. See
Cornelia J.W. Baaij, Liberal Justice and the Creeping Privatization of State
Power, 67 DRAKE L. REV. 561, 562-65 (2019) [hereinafter Liberal Justice].
50 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 615 (1985) ("[T]he federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution ...
applies with special force in the field of international commerce."); David L.
Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 923 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1991)
("The policy in favor of arbitration is even stronger in the context of international business transactions.") (citations omitted).
51 See Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 8 (1972) (citing the "expansion of overseas commercial activities by business enterprises based in
the United States" as reason to allow traders to opt-out of the U.S. legal system);
see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 638 ("As international trade has
expanded in recent decades, so too has the use of international arbitration to
resolve disputes arising in the course of that trade.'); Chapter 2 of the FAA,
Pub. L. No. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692 (1970), enacted by Congress in 1970, implements the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (ensures the uncomplicated enforceability of arbitral awards given in any of the
168 participating states).
52 See also Cornelis J.W. Baaij, A Case of Mistaken Identity: Questioning
the U.S. Supreme Court's Contract Theory of Arbitration, 14 VA. L. & Bus. REV.
121, 122, 128 (2020) [hereinafter Mistaken Identity].
68 See infra Section I.B.
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to the principle of contractual autonomy, the Court reasons that
Congress wanted to treat arbitration as a matter of contract and
that therefore the parties' "intentions control."54 It is a "foundational FAA principle," the Court has stated repeatedly, "that arbitration is [strictly] a matter of consent."55 Hence, when parties
contract for arbitration, courts protect the contractual rights and
expectations as much as any other agreement. 56 With regard to the
principle of contractual efficiency, the Court has found that agreements are especially enforceable based on a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration as an efficient alternative to litigation. It
reasons that arbitration offers the same quality of dispute resolution that courts do, but for less money, time, and effort. 57
54 Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 626 C'Thus, as with any other contract, the parties' intentions control"); Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct.
1407, 1416 (2019) ("Consent is essential under the FAA."); Am. Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 233 (2013) ("[The text of the FAA] reflects
the overarching principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.") (quoting
Rent·A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010)).
•• Stolt.Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l, 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010) C'[T]he
foundational FAA principle that arbitration is a matter of consent."); Granite
Rock Co. v. Int'l Bhd. Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 298 n.6 (2010) (''Indeed, the
rule that arbitration is strictly a matter of consent ... is the cornerstone of the
framework the Court announced.'); GE Energy Power Conversion Fr. SAS, Corp.
v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1637, 1649 (2020) (Sotomayor,
J., concurring) ("[T]he FAA's consent principle itself is crystalline.').
66 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351 (2011) C'Arbitration
is a matter of contract, and the FAA requires courts to honor parties' expecta ·
tions."); Allied·Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 275 (1995)
("[T]he Act's basic purpose [is] to put arbitration provisions on the same footing as a contract's other terms.") (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Scherk v. Alberto·Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)); Volt Info. Scis., Inc.
v. Bd. of Trs. Leland Stan. Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 469 (1989) C'Arbitration
under the Act in a matter of consent, not coercion, and the parties are gener·
ally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit."); id. at 479
C'By permitting the courts to 'rigorously enforce' such agreements according
to their terms ... we give effect to the contractual rights and expectations of
the parties.'').
67 See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1621 (2018) (interpreting
Congress as judging that arbitration offered ''the promise of quicker, more informal, and often cheaper resolutions for everyone involved'); see also Adkins
v. Lab. Ready, Inc., 303 F.3d 496, 500 (4th Cir. 2002) C'Underlying this policy
is Congress's view that arbitration constitutes a more efficient dispute resolution
process than litigation.'); Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 636 C'There is no
reason to assume at the outset of the dispute that international arbitration
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The Court's premise of arbitration's autonomy and efficiencyenhancing abilities is hardly controversial, especially in the context
of commercial arbitration between professional parties. 58 Indeed,
arbitration is widely considered a way for transactors to freely agree
to a private form of dispute resolution that offers more procedural
control and flexibility 59 and is cheaper than civillitigation. 60
Still, from the viewpoint of political philosophy, the justification of such a broad application of the FAA deserves scrutiny.61
Judicial reasoning offers both litigants and the public a theory of
the law that explains, not only a court's ruling as the logical outcome of the applicable rules and legal principles, but also as a
justification for the state's coercive force in compelling compliance with the ruling.62
will not provide an adequate mechanism."); AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns
Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986) (noting the "the greater institutional competence of arbitrators in interpreting collective bargaining agreements'').
•• Notwithstanding, this author has argued elsewhere that while the Court's
express reasoning alludes to only contractual autonomy and contractual efficiency, a theory best explaining the Court's theory of arbitration law is one
in which both principles are subordinated to a third, implied principle under
which the state pledges its coercive force to a quasi-judicial branch of the private
sector. See Mistaken Identity, supra note 52, at 151-53.
69 See, e.g., Buys, supra note 17, at 138 ("Party autonomy is one of the hall·
marks of arbitration.''); Kevin A Sullivan, The Problems of Permitting Expanded
Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 46
ST. LoUIS UNN. L.J. 509, 556 (2002) ("There is no doubt that parties possess
the freedom to sculpt their arbitration process as they see fit.'').
so See Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearing S. 1005 and
H.R. 646 Before the Subcomms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 31 (1924); cf BORN,
supra note 34, at 86 ("[A]rbitration is usually materially less slow than litigation of comparable disputes.''). Contra Paul Friedland & Stavros Brekoulakis,
2018 International Arbitration Survey: The Evolution of International Arbitration
(2018), http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/researcb/2018/ [bttps://perma.cc/57DS
-3V8S] (showing a continuing trend of arbitration users being most discontent with the cost of arbitration).
"' In other works, this author addresses the significance of sound judicial
justification of arbitration law in more detail. See Mistaken Identity, supra note
52, at 127; Liberal Justice, supra note 49, at 562--65.
62 Mistaken Identity, supra note 52, at 123, 126--27. In the context of contract
law, see Jody S. Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE & l'HILOSOPHY OF LAW 687, 694-96 (Jules Coleman & Scott J.
Shapiro eds., 2004) [hereinafter Philosophy of Contract Law] (distinguishing be·
tween, but explaining the close connection between the explanatory and justifica·
tory tasks of theories of contact); see also Dennis Patterson, The Pseudo-Debate
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Hence, to assess the strength of the Supreme Court's reliance
on contractual autonomy and efficiency, one must determine whether
the practice of commercial arbitration meets the requirements that
these principles of contract law set. Accordingly, the remainder
of Part I will explore one requirement that both autonomy-based
and efficiency-based theories of contract law have in common: that
malleable rules applied by adjudicators be predictable to future
contracting parties. sa

B. Looking to the Debate on Default Rules
The significance of commercial certainty in autonomy and
efficiency theories of contract law is best exemplified by concentrating on contract default rules. Contract default rules are a
critical part of any explanatory or justificatory theory of contract
law, given that defaults encompass the bulk of contract law.64
Default rules are rules that parties may contract around if they
wish but that will apply when the contract is silent on a matter.65
Hence, contract defaults are nonmandatory and thus malleable
rules that govern a contractual relationship for a specific issue if
transactors have not provided for the issue at hand or agree to
an alternative term.ss A conventional, albeit controversial, depiction
Over Default Rules in Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 235, 239 (1993)
("The court's decision is an exercise in justification.'); Randy E. Barnett, A Consent
Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 269 (1986) [hereinafter Consent
Theory of Contract] (''We look to legal theory to tell us when the use of legal
force against an individual is morally justified.').
63 See infra Section lB.
64 George S. Geis, An Experiment in the Optimal Precision of Contract Default Rules, 80 TuL. L. REV. 1109, 1110, 1112--13 (2005).
•• Id. at 1110.
66 See Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and Promise, 109 COLUM.
L. REV. 1603, 1631 (2009) [hereinafter Correspondence of Contract] ("Contract
law solves this problem by adopting default rules that provide a set of terms,
or mechanisms for generating them, that will be imputed into all contracts
unless the parties indicate otherwise.'); Lawrence B. Solum, The Boundaries
of Legal Discourse and the Debate Over Default Rules in Contract Law, 3 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 311, 313 (1993) (describing one notion of default rules as
distinguished from mandatory rules); Randy E. Barnett, Rational Bargaining
Theory and Contract: Default Rules, Hypothetical Consent, the Duty to Disclose,
and Fraud, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL"Y 783, 784 (1992) [hereinafter Rational
Bargaining Theory] (characterizing default rules by their feature "that they
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further portrays default rules as ''background rules" that will provide a contract term where the contract is left open.67 Default rules
then fill the gaps of contracts the parties left intentionally, 68 inadvertently,69 or unavoidably70 incomplete. A contract can thus
be conceived as an amalgamation of both general state-provided
default rules and the tailored rights and obligations individually
negotiated by the contracting parties. 71
Normative autonomy-based and efficiency-based theories
present contrasting views on what constitutes a "good'' default rule. 72
In the 1990s, authors from both schools of thought engaged in an
energetic scholarly debate about which judicial and statutory
can be supplanted by the expressed consent of the parties'); Jason Scott Johnston,
Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100
YALE L.J. 615, 615-16 (1990) C'[A]n implicit term of a contract unless the contracting parties explicitly agree to vary it."); Richard Craswell, Contract Law,
Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REv. 489, 490 (1989)
("[T]he term 'default rules' more commonly refers only to those rules which
the parties are free to vary by appropriate language in their contract.").
67 Sound of Silence, supra note 21, at 822-23 (describing the orthodox view
in the theory of contract); see also Patterson, supra note 62, at 237 (calling
these "substantive" default rules, as opposed to "interpretative" ones, which
help resolve ambiguities in the contractual language).
68 Solum, supra note 66, at 329 ("Consider a third source of contractual
gaps: the omission by the parties of an anticipatable contingency.').
69 CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION 71 (2d ed. 2015) (likening gap-filling default rules to ''picking up
after contractual accidents").
70 Sound of Silence, supra note 21, at 821 ("By now everyone acknowledges
the legal realist insight that all contracts are, by necessity, incomplete to
some degree.").
71 Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An
Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73
CAL. L. REV. 261, 261 (1985) C'Although the state's general rules of contract
provide a set of standard gap·filling assumptions or implied terms, almost every
agreement requires the parties to provide some additional individualized content."). Default rules do not merely apply to remedies but also, for example,
the construction and interpretation of contracts. For an economic theory of interpretative default rules, see Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory
and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 548--50 (2003) [hereinafter
Limits of Contract Law]; Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926, 930--32, 935 (20 10) [hereinafter Contract
Interpretation Redux]. Additionally, for statutory default rules on the delivery
of goods in sale agreements, see U.C.C. § 2-308 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L.
COMM'N 2020).
72 Mistaken Identity, supra note 52, at 128--32.
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default rules the law should set.73 Judicial default rules are those
promulgated by the courts through precedential constraint, 74
while statutory default rules are issued by a legislature. 75
The debate on default rules between autonomy and efficiency theorists stems from their divergent normative conceptions
of contract law. 76 On the one hand, autonomy-based theories explain or justify contract law as protecting or advancing the a priori
right of transactors to shape their destiny as they see fit.77 Hence,
autonomy-based theories assess the state's use of force in compelling compliance with contractual obligations by the parties' entitlements or rights. 78 In brief, enforcement of a contract is justified
only when the parties, on their own accord, assented to the contractual obligation. 79 As Hanoch Dagan explains, undertaking
Sound of Silence, supra note 21, at 871-75. A third theory that is party
of the debate is the Relational Theory of contract. See also Randy E. Barnett,
Conflicting V!Sions: A Critique of Ian Macneil's Relational Theory of Contract,
78 VA. L. REV. 1175, 1178--82 (1992) (highlighting the similarities and differences between Macneil's and Barnett's theories of contract law). See generally
IAN MACNEIL, THE RELATIONAL THEORY OF CONTRACT: SELECTED WORKS OF
IAN MACNEIL (David Campbell, abridged ed. 2001).
74 John F. Horty, Rules and Reasons in the Theory of Precedent, 17 LEGAL
THEORY 1, 1 (2011) (''The doctrine of precedent ... has at its heart ... a logicaccording to which the decisions of earlier courts in particular cases somehow
generalize to constrain the decisions of later courts facing different cases.');
cf. Patterson, supra note 62, at 238 ("Courts do not set default rules. Courts
interpret contracts.'} The private sector can generate quasi-statutory default
rules as well, for example by drafting sector·specific boilerplate contract terms.
See Private Commercial Law, supra note 16, at 1731-34; Goetz & Scott, supra
note 71, at 303.
75 Goetz & Scott, supra note 71, at 317. For a comparison of statutory and
judicial default rules in terms of efficiency, see Riley, supra note 23, at 387--89.
76 See Hanoch Dagan, Autonomy, Pluralism, and Contract Law Theory, 76
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19, 20 (2013).
77 Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 806 (1941)
("[T]he principle of private autonomy ... simply means that the law views pri·
vate individuals as possessing a power to effect, within certain limits, changes in
their legal relations [through entering into contracts with others].'}
78 Sound of Silence, supra note 21, at 840 ("The liberal conception of justice
regulates the use of force in society by the concept of entitlements or rights.').
79 Nathan B. Oman, The Failure of Economic Interpretations of the Law of
Contract Damages, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 829, 831 (2007) (describing the
autonomous school of thought as the view that contract law involves "advanc·
ing the liberal ideal of personal autonomy by giving legal effect to the private
decisions of contracting parties').
78
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voluntary commitments is indispensable for self-authorship.80 Contract's normative powers, Professor Dagan and Michael Heller
elaborate, ''facilitate the temporally extended horizon of action'' and
are, thus, a "core condition of autonomy," which is "important for
self-determination."81 The law can advance autonomy in this manner because it extends to parties the state's power to compel each
into compliance with their contractual obligations if need be. 82
On the other hand, economic theories of contract law explain or justify the law on contracts as a means to create economic
value, that is, to maximize societal welfare in the economic sense,
as Judge Richard Posner stated.83 These theories present an instrumental depiction of the state's involvement with private bargains, namely as a means to realize societal wealth. 84 Contract
law is thus justified if it supplies transactors the appropriate
so See Dagan, supra note 76, at 27 (discussing, and to this extent agreeing
with, the premise of Joseph Raz's perfectionist take on contractual autonomy);
see also JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 370 (1988) ('The autonomous
person is part author of his life .... An autonomous person's well-being consists in the successful pursuits of self-chosen goals and relationships."); Dori
Kimel, Personal Autonomy and Change of Mind in Promise and in Contract, in
PHlLOSOPHlCAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 96 (Gregory Klass et al. eds.,
2014) (defining personal autonomy as "an ideal of self-authorship" and "the
capacity to self-impose an obligation-to self-legislate, to be the willing author
of significant dimensions of one's own normative environment").
8t mtimate Value, supra note 23, at 166.
82 Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARv. L. REV. 553, 587 (1933)
("[T]he law of contract confers sovereignty on one party over another []by
putting the state's forces at the disposal of the former."); see also Anthony T.
Kronman, Contract Law and the State of Nature, 1 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 5, 5 (1985)
(describing a legally enforceable contracts as a means by which it enables the
parties ''to harness the state's powers of coercion for their own private ends').
83 Richard A Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 103, 119 (1979) [hereinafter Utilitarianism]; see also BRIAN H.
BIX, CONTRACT LAW: RULES, THEORY, AND CONTEXT 98 (2012); STEPHEN A.
SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 4 7 (2004); Consent Theory of Contract, supra note
62, at 277-78.
84 Brian Z. Tamanaha, How an Instrumental Vzew of Law Corrodes the Rule
of Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 469, 469 (2007) (labeling this perception of contract law ''legal instrumentalism," describing it as using the law as "a means
to an end or an instrument for the social good"); Utilitarianism, supra note
83, at 127 (''The rights derived from economic theory are not, to be sure, bestowed by God or otherwise transcendental; they are 'mere' instruments of
wealth maximization.').

2022]

RULES OF REGULARITY

671

incentives to increase the efficiency of their transactionB5 and so
maximize their expected joint surplus86 and ultimately optimize
the social gains from trade.s7
Given their deontological and instrumentalist foundations,
autonomy respectively efficiency theories of contract law present
starkly different normative views of default rules. 88
Autonomy-based theorists consider judicial default rules
to be most appropriate when they are based on the actual situation
of the parties in question rather than on an objectified, hypothetical, or average transactor in the parties' position. 89 Autonomybased theories do not reject default rules for being applied when
the contract is silent, hence, when the parties have not expressed
their intent to be bound by these default terms.9o According to
Professor Barnett, a party's consent to be legally bound presumes
that one consented to a court's invoking default rules. 91 That said,
normative autonomy-based theories prefer to see judicial default
rules applied ex post, which is to say, tailored to the individual
parties between whom the dispute has arisen.92 Professor Barnett
argues that when a court gauges whether a contract's silence signals a parties' consent to the prevailing default rule to fill the gap, 93
85 See, e.g., PETER BENSON, JUSTICE IN TRANSACTIONS: A THEORY OF CONTRACT LAw 160--61 (2019) (discussing the benefits of expressly stating requirements for efficient contracts); HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL HELLER, THE
CHOICE THEORY OF CONTRACTS 52 (2017) (social incentives); Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Philosophy of Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE
AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 623, 625--26 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds.,
2002) (discussing liability and its incentives).
BB Limits of Contract Law, supra note 71, at 603 (describing the relevant
benchmark for standards as giving an ''incentive to maximize joint returns in
the course of maximizing its private gain"); Contract Interpretation Redux,
supra note 71, at 942 n.44 (describing one of the functions of commercial
contracts as "creat[ing] incentives for parties to maximize expected surplus'}
87 BIX, supra note 83, at 134--35; Limits of Contract Law, supra note 71, at 544.
88 See Zipursky, supra note 85, at 654-55.
89 BENSON, supra note 85, at 112 (making a case against the benchmark of
the "'detached observer"' or ''hypothetical third party" when courts find the
contracting parties' intent).
90 See Riley, supra note 23, at 369--70 (noting that default rules can be applied because parties ''have subjectively consented to be bound [by such rules]'}
91 Sound of Silence, supra note 21, at 860--62.
92 Philosophy of Contract Law, supra note 62, at 689--90.
93 Sound of Silence, supra note 21, at 826. Part of the scholarly debate on
defaults have concentrated on the difficulty for courts to figure out whether
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it might still draw on more objective circumstances such as trade
usage.94 Nevertheless, an autonomy-inspired court would always
look to stay as close to the individual situation as possible. 95 For
this reason, Peter Benson, a proponent of the autonomy-based,
transactional theory of contract law, rejects the orthodox notion
that default rules fill contractual gaps because of an unavoidable
contractual incompleteness. 96 The idea of contractual gaps assumes as its idealistic benchmark a perfectly complete contract,
thus assuming that gap-filling is based on anything other than
the parties' mutual assent.97
In contrast, for an efficiency theorist, the preferred default
rule increases the efficiency of the contract-making process by
saving the overall costs associated with the transaction. 98 Such
default rules thus maximize the contracting parties' joint wealth. 99
Two variants on this theme have appeared from a debate within
law and economics.1°0 The first, and more conventional, view is
that default rules are efficient if they save future transactors the
trouble of negotiating these terms themselves_lOl It follows, then,
parties implicitly consented to a given default rule when one of the parties was
in an unequal information position. See, e.g., Rational Bargaining Theory, supra
note 66, at 783 ("I ... explain how rational bargaining, hypothetical consent,
and actual consent figure in the determination of contractual default rules.").
94 Sound of Silence, supra note 21, at 862 n.90 and accompanying text.
95 Sound of Silence, supra note 21, at 861---62 ("[W]e must always seek the
most plausible interpretation of the conduct of the parties within the relevant
community of discourse.'1; id. at 862 n.90 ("Of course, if it can be shown that
the parties are highly idiosyncratic and have in essence their own 'private
language,' then the 'community of discourse' consists solely of them."); see also
Consent Theory of Contract, supra note 62, at 306--07 (''In a consent theory,
then, contracts are interpreted with an eye towards honoring the actual intentions of the parties.').
96 BENSON, supra note 85, at 124-25.
97 Id. at 125.
9B Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the
Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 732 (1991) [hereinafter Strategic Contractual Inefficiency] ('We examine how transaction costs and market
power affect the strategic incentives to contract around different default rules.').
99 Russell Korobkin, Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNElL
L. REV. 608, 611 (1998).
1oo See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 92--94 (1989) [hereinafter
Filling Gaps] (giving an overview of the two approaches to default rules).
1o1 See JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 92--93, 173--75 (1992).
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that the content of default rules best reflect the contract terms
to which most transactors would agree1D2 and fewer transactorsthe odd ones out-would contract around. 103 This assumption
applies specifically to contracts between firms or corporations.1°4
Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott defend this narrower scope because the economic reasoning involved typifies the behavior of these
professional transactors in commercial transactions. 105 The 'majoritarian' default rules thus function as implied terms, as Charles
Goetz and Professor Scott write, lOS or as standardized contractual
terms in the words of Judge Posner.1D7 Majoritarian default rules
require a court to construct a hypothetical bargain, which the
parties would have agreed to if they had tended to the matter _lOB
Correspondence of Contract, supra note 66, at 1631-32 (''With a few
possible exceptions, contract default rules are best understood as attempts to
impute into contracts terms that most similarly situated parties would have
wanted to include had they considered them.').
1oa Riley, supra note 23, at 386 ("[S]ome parties may be left worse off in
virtue oflegislative rules on which they are fully aware ex ante.').
104 See Contract Interpretation Redux, supra note 71, at 946 (discussing
why firms would spend more time writing contracts).
105 Limits of Contract Law, supra note 71, at 544-45 (citing contracts be·
tween firms ''the main subject of what is commonly called contract law" and
stating that these "can be expected to understand how to make business contracts, and the theory we develop applies only to contracts between two such
firms'); Robert E. Scott, The Rise and Fall of Article 2, 62 LA. L. REV. 1009,
1019 (2002) (describing this strategy as ''lill[ing] contractual gaps according to
assumptions about the risks that parties similarly situated would plausibly have
agreed to bear at the time the contract was made"); see also Filling Gaps, supra
note 100, at 89 n.18 ("Looking backward to what the present litigants 'would
have wanted' is analytically analogous to looking forward to what prospective
contractors will want.').
106 Goetz & Scott, supra note 71, at 262 (depicting this conception of default
rule8---{)r implied terms-as belonging to "the Expanded Choice postulate').
107 Default rules then perform the function of standard terms. See RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 96--97 (7th ed. 2007).
108 COLEMAN, supra note 101, at 165 (describing the position of economic
scholars as saying that the most optimal default rules "'mimics' the outcome
of a hypothetical contract between them," that is, the contract ''the parties
would have made had the transaction costs not made their doing so irrational");
Alan Schwartz, The Default Rule Paradigm and the Limits of Contract Law, 3
S. CALIF. INTERDISC. L.J. 389, 390 (1993) (labeling this type of default rules
''problem-solving defaults," in other words, those that "suppl[y] a satisfactory
solution to a contracting problem to parties whose contract lacks that solution');
102
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In comparison, the other efficiency variant goes the exact
opposite routeJ09 Scholars in this corner, most notably Ian Ayres
and Robert Gertner, argue that some default rules are more efficient
if fewer transactors agree to these. no These "non-majoritarian,"
"minoritarian,"lll or "penalty" defaults112 thus incentivize most
transactors to contract out of an unwelcome default rule_l13 To
Professor Ayres and Professor Gertner, defaults can be informationforcing rules.1 14 Such default rules can be efficient if, for example, negotiating to exclude or alter such rule would disclose a
party's private information that could make ex post dispute resolution more efficient.1 15 Notwithstanding the different outcomes,
majoritarian and nonmajoritarian analyses have in common that,
contrary to autonomy-based theories, judicial default rules might
be applied in disputes between today's litigants ex post, but aimed
at future transactors ex ante.116
Notwithstanding the varying expectations that efficiency and
autonomy-based theories have of default rules, both approaches
cf. Omri Ben-Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules,
33 FLA. ST. UNN. L. REV. 651, 674-75 (2006) (contencling that parties may acquiesce to an unfavorable default, for example, when proposing to contract
out of the rule might drive away his prospective contracting partner).
109 Filling Gaps, supra note 100, at 95.
11o See, e.g., id. at 93 (explaining, for example, that this "majoritarian approach'' actually ''fails to account for the possibly disparate costs of contracting
and of failing to contract around different defaults'').
m mtimate Value, supra note 23, at 156.
112 Filling Gaps, supra note 100, at 91 ("[E]fficient defaults would take a
variety of forms that at times would diverge from the 'what the parties would
have contracted for' principle.''); cf. Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default
Rules in Contract Law Default Rules in Private and Public Law: An Exchange
on Penalty Default Rules, 33 FIA STATE UNN. L. REV. 563, 586 (2005) r'[T]here are
no penalty default rules .... [R]ules that seem designed to smoke out private
information ... do not reflect the logic of Ayres and Gertner's Hadley model.'').
113 See Schwartz, supra note 108, at 414 (critically describing such a default
rule "a transformative default," which "is chosen to violate the acceptability constraint: these defaults are enacted to change preferences, not to satisfy them'').
114 Filling Gaps, supra note 100, at 97.
115 ld. ~'[P]enalty default rules can be justified as a way to encourage the
production of information" because "[t]he very process of 'contracting around'
can reveal information ... to third parties, especially courts.'').
116 Scott, supra note 105, at 1019 ~This strategy is designed to protect (and
even improve) the utility of the set of contracting signals for future parties.'').
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have one condition in common.1 17 As is shown next, both theories, albeit for differing reasons, call for judicial default rules to
be publicized to be transparent and predictable to future transactors ex ante.llB

C. A Need for Predictability Ex Ante
For efficiency theories, the prerequisite of predictability is
comparatively apparent given its preference to apply default
rules ex ante.1 19 Regardless of which default rules are more efficient than others, an economic analysis of default rules will call
for default rules to be publicized and applied with a predictable
consistency to enable future transactors to consider these when
negotiating the terms of their contract.1 20 Defaults that are difficult to predict are likely inefficient; they force the parties to incur the transaction costs of either reducing uncertainties in the
negotiation stage121 or risking an encounter with unwelcome default rules in the dispute resolution stage.l22 Already if one of the
parties is unaware of prevailing default rules, the contract might
turn out less efficient than when both parties were informed_123
See infra notes 119--27.
See infra notes 119--27.
119 Strategic Contractual Inefficiency, supra note 98, at 759--60; Craswell,
supra note 66, at 507.
120 Strategic Contractual Inefficiency, supra note 98, at 759--60; Sound of
Silence, supra note 21, at 793; Craswell, supra note 66, at 507 n.45; see also
Riley, supra note 23, at 386-87 (underscoring that both statutory and judicial
default rules are ideally publicized in advance of any particular contract and
discoverable for the parties).
121 See Scott, supra note 105, at 1033 (discussing the ''increased transactions costs and complicated efforts to contract out of' of vague legal default).
122 Id. at 1017 (seeing the potential of lowering litigation costs in the context of doctrines that let process defects limit contractual freedom); see also
m

11s

ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES

48 (1994).
12a See Korobkin, supra note 99, at 619 ("A similarly inefficient contract
could result when the party favored by the default term has knowledge of the
default rule while the other party does not."); Strategic Contractual Inefficiency, supra note 98, at 98 (reasoning that a penalty default should in par·
ticular be against the relatively informed party "when the uninformed party is
also uninformed about the default rule itself' because if the uninformed party
"does not know that there is a penalty default, she will have no opportunistic
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However, if both parties are uninformed of a prevailing default
rule, efficiency may only happen by happenstance.124 Recall that,
from the vantage point of efficiency-based theories, contract default
rules are a means to a societal end, namely wealth maximization.1 25
A judicial default rule must thus be capable of offering transactors distinct incentives, which is impossible if the rule is not
publicized or otherwise not knowable to the parties.12s
Autonomy-based theories of contract law also call for judicial default rules to be publicized and discoverable for future contracting parties ex ante.127 This condition is not an obvious one,
given that, as previously said, autonomy-based theories prefer
judicial default rules directed at the present contracting parties
ex post, not on other future parties ex anteJ2B Still, because explanatory autonomy-based theories do not deny that such default
rules can and do exist, the theories' justificatory position is that
they must be discoverable ex ante to meet the demands of contractual autonomy_129 In the view of autonomy-based theories, the
law protects--or is to protect-the autonomy, the freedom, or the
right to opt out of default rules.1 3 For contract law to support

°

incentives'~; Schwartz,

supra note 108, at 390--91 (labelling default rules that are
unfavorable to parties that are generally more informed than their counterparts,
''information-forcing defaults'~.
124 See, e.g., Strategic Contractual Inefficiency, supra note 98, at 91 ("Penalty
defaults are designed to give at least one party to the contract an incentive to
contract around the default rule and therefore to choose affirmatively the contract provision they prefer.").
125 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
12s Riley, supra note 23, at 386 ("[L]egislative defaults ... will typically be
promulgated in advance of any particular contract into which they will be im·
plied, and should thus be discoverable by the parties before they contract.'}
However, from a nonmajoritarian perspective, an unpredictable default rule
might still be desirable. Such a rule may function as a penalty default if the
costs of commercial uncertainty prompt parties to negotiate express contractual arrangements if an economic analysis shows these arrangements will
increase the efficiency of the overall transactions. Professor Ayres categorizes
such a default rules as a "clarity-requiring altering rule." See Ian Ayres,
Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J.
2032, 2072--7 4 (2012).
121 Id. at 386--87.
12s See supra notes 89--92 and accompanying text.
129 Sound of Silence, supra note 21, at 861-62.
1ao Scott, supra note 105, at 1027, 1054 (in describing Llewellyn's position

behind the default rules ofU.C.C. Article 2).
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self-authorship, Professor Dagan and Professor Heller point out
that it is vital that the "predictability that [the promisee's] expectations will be fulfilled."131 After all, moral agency, as Seana
Shiffrin writes, requires the ''law and its rationale ... be transparent and accessible to the moral agent."132 Professor Barnett
agrees that default rules must be promulgated to fit an autonomy-based theory of contract.1 33 Transactors must be placed in a
position to predict contract default rules to determine which contractual arrangement is in their best interest. 134 To Professor
Barnett, the parties assent to a court's application of default rules
if they have expressed consent to be legally bound, yet, only if they
have been given an opportunity to contract out of the default rule.135
It cannot be inferred from a contract's silence that any default
rule was assented to ''if the parties had no reason to know of the
rule," he writes,l36 In that case, the enforcement of the default
rule as part of the contract is not justified.137
In other words, both autonomy- and efficiency-based contract theories ask for transactors to be given "transactional security," that is, the confidence that the other party will honor its
agreement once one invests in the transaction first,l38 The state's
mtimate Value, supra note 23, at 166.
Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120
HARV. L. REV. 708, 718 (2007); see also LoN L. FuLLER, MORALITY OF LAW 3339 (1969) (writing that one of the ways in which legal rules may miscarry is
the ''failure to publicize, or at least to make available to the affected party,
the rules he is expected to observe'').
188 Sound of Silence, supra note 21, at 862.
134 Consent Theory of Contract, supra note 62, at 271 (''[A] consent theory
enables parties to calculate better who bears the risk of reliance and, hence,
facilitates reliance on interpersonal commitments.''); Sound of Silence, supra
note 21, at 862 n.91 (''The liberal conception of the rule of law ... makes the
advanced promulgation of legal rules a norm of a truly legal system.').
135 Sound of Silence, supra note 21, at 865 (arguing that, "[g]iven the op·
portunity to deviate from the default rules, it is unrealistic to depict implied·
in·law default rules as being 'imposed upon' the parties").
136 Id. at 866.
187 Consent Theory of Contract, supra note 62, at 319 ("A consent theory of
contractual obligation views certain agreements as legally binding because
the parties bring to the transaction certain rights and they manifest their
assent to the transfer of these rights.'').
13B Sound of Silence, supra note 21, at 864-66; Consent Theory of Contract,
supra note 62, at 319--20.
131
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promise-or threat-to enforce contractual agreements supplies
this transactional security_139 The discoverability of ex ante of
default rules applied ex post140 expands the range of transactions
parties can engage in and reduces the risk of a noncompliant contracting partner and thus the costs of contract-making.1 41 Naturally, it is not guaranteed that individual contractors happen to
be aware of any prevailing default rules.1 42 In fact, judicial default rules might be more challenging to construct that statutory
ones_143 However, without promulgation, defaults would be undiscoverable altogether.144
This theoretical analysis of default rules elucidates what
the principles of contractual autonomy and contractual efficiency
expect of commercial arbitration.1 45 As seen, both autonomy-based
and efficiency-based theories of contract law, albeit for different
reasons, require that the malleable rules of contract law applied
by adjudicators in resolving disputes are predictable or foreseeable to future contracting parties in advance.1 46 For the same
'"" Emily Erikson & Joseph M. Parent, Central Authority and Order, 25

Socro. THEORY 245, 248 n.4 (2007) ("[A]t least one actor has to trust the other

to take a specific action, at some personal risk to the actor bestowing trust.');
Kronman, supra note 82, at 28 ("[T]he existence of a centralized mechanism
for the enforcement of promises does greatly increase tile security of the parties
and at a comparatively low cost (at least up to a point).'); Dan M. Kahan, The
Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MlCH. L. REV. 71,
103 (2003).
140 Riley, supra note 23, at 387 ("[O]nce the default rules has been adjudicatively promulgated, it will be discoverable by tllose who contract after that
date.').
141 Avner Greif, Contracting, Enforcement, and Efficiency: Economics Beyond
the Law, in ANNuAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
239, 248--49 (1996).
142 Riley, supra note 23, at 386; Strategic Contractual Inefficiency, supra
note 98, at 759--60 (discussing the problem of both parties having incomplete
information on a legal default rule).
148 Riley, supra note 23, at 387 C'[H]ow far rules hidden in the deptlls of
law reports are likely to be appreciated by prospective contractors must be
doubtful.').
144 See also FuLLER, supra note 132, at 38 (writing that one of the ways in
which legal rules may ''miscarry" is tile ''failure to publicize, or at least to make
available to the affected party, the rules he is expected to observe").
145 See supra notes 119--37 and accompanying text.
146 See supra notes 119--37 and accompanying text.
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reason, the basic tenets of both types of theories require the transparency of the malleable rules of arbitration.147 In the reasoning
of the Supreme Court, arbitration allows participants significant
leeway in setting their own substantive and procedural rules. 148
If it is difficult to assess how arbitrators will apply these rules,
the parties' autonomy and the opportunity to optimize efficiency
are reduced.1 49
Hence, insofar arbitral decision-making is difficult to predict by future transactors, commercial arbitration serves neither
autonomy nor efficiency optimally_150 To put it differently, if the
practice of arbitration is to fully live up to the basic premise underpinning the Supreme Court's broad application of the FAA,
arbitral decision-making should be as transparent as possible.15 1
Part II will argue that the current practice of domestic and crossborder commercial arbitration is lacking in this respectJ52

II.

COMMERCIAL CERTAINTY AND ARBITRAL DECISION-MAKING

A. Confidentiality and a Lack of Arbitral Stare Decisis
Two features of commercial arbitration stand in the way
of delivering the degree of commercial certainty that the principles of contractual autonomy and contractual efficiency demand:
a prevailing culture of confidentiality and the lack of a practice
of stare decisis.153
First, participants in commercial arbitration tend to prefer
keeping both the arbitral proceedings and the ensuing arbitral decisions private or confidential_154 Prominent arbitration institutions
See supra notes 119--37 and accompanying text (knowledge of how a rule
is applied to the facts of specific cases is just as important as the ex ante knowl·
edge of it in making legal decisions).
14B AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344-45 (2011).
149 See supra notes 118-37 and accompanying text; AT&T Mobility LLC,
563 U.S. at 344-45.
160 See infra notes 153--58, 164-71 and accompanying text.
151 AT&T Mobility LLC, 563 U.S. at 344-45.
152 See infra notes 154-84 and accompanying text.
153 See supra notes 119--41 and accompanying text.
154 See, e.g., Laurie Dore, Public Courts Versus Private Justice: It's Time to Let
Some Sun Shine in on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 81 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 463,
466 (2006) C'Arbitration is frequently conducted pursuant to confidentiality
147
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like the London Court of International Arbitration (''LCIA"), the
Singapore International Arbitration Centre ("SIAC''), and the
Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre ("HKIAC") do not
publicize arbitral decisions in any form. 155 Other institutions do
publish a small selection of anonymized excerpts or redacted arbitral awards, such as the American Arbitration Center ("AAK'),
including its international division, the International Centre for
Dispute Resolution ncDR'),156 the International Court of Arbitration,157 as well as the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce ("SCC')-158
Until recently, however, the number of excerpted awards was too
small to infer any patterns of arbitral decision-making_159
rules and agreements that can conceal the existence and substance of a dispute, the identity of the parties, and the resolution of the controversy."); see also
Richard M. Alderman, Consumer Arbitration: The Destruction of the Common
Law, 2 J. AM. ARB. 1, 11 (2003); BORN, supra note 34, at 87 ("[Confidentiality]
often serves to prevent aggravation of the parties' dispute, to limit any collateral damage of a dispute and to focus the parties' energies on an amicable,
business-like resolution of their disagreements.'); QuEEN MARY UNN. LoNDON &
PWC, CORPORATE CHOICES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES 8 (2013) (showing that confidentiality is one of the most important
reasons for business enterprises to opt for arbitration, although the degree to
which appears to depend to some extent on the industry sector).
166 Jane Parsons, Publish and Be Damned: Should We Embrace the Systematic Publication of Arbitral Awards?, ARB. BLOG (Feb. 27, 2017), http://
arbitrationblog.practicallaw.com/publish-and-be-damned-should-we-embrace
-the-systematic-publication-of-arbitral-awards/ [bttps://perma.cc/Q6FN-F4UK]
(supplying a concise overview of the rate and publications of arbitral awards).
166 See INT'L CENTRE DISP. RESOL., ICDRAWARDS AND COMMENTARIES 97-199
(Grant Hanessian & Jacob M. Kaplan eds., 2012).
167 See ICC Digital Library ICC Awards, INT'L CHAMBER COM. [hereinafter
ICC Digital Library], https:lllibrary.iccwbo.org/dr-awards.htm [bttps://perma
.cc/7S5J-KB43].
168 See SCC Awards Now Released Online, ARB. INST. STOCKHOLM CHAMBER
COM. (Oct. 22, 2020), https:l/sccinstitute.com/about-the-scc/news/2020/scc-awards
-now-released-online/ [bttps://perma.cc/JD2E-QLPH].
169 See Publication of ICC Arbitral Awards with Jus Mundi, INT'L CHAMBER
COM., https:l/iccwbo.org/dispute-resolution-services/arbitration/publication-of
-icc-arbitral-awards-with-jus-mundi/ [bttps://perma.cc/4GAW-CNC5]. On average,
the ICC approves over 500 final and partial awards each year, based on 2017
(512 awards), 2018 (599 awards), and 2019 (586 awards), but published the
abstracts of only 3 to 15 awards per year between 1986 and 2012. See INT'L
CHAMBER COM., DISPUTE RESOLUTION BULLETIN 62 (2018); INT'L CHAMBER
COM., 2018 DISPUTE RESOLUTION STATISTICS 14 (2019) [hereinafter INT'L
CHAMBER COM. 2019]; INT'L CHAMBER COM., 2019 DISPUTE RESOLUTION STATISTICS 16 (2020); see also ICC Digital Library, supra note 157.
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As of April 2021, the ICC Court moved towards offering
full public access to all publishable ICC awards rendered from
2019 onward, in its "commitments to facilitate access to justice,
enhance the global rule-based order, and improve transparency
in arbitration."lSO However, it is too soon to say today whether this
unprecedented move will significantly increase the share of summaries of ICC awards becoming available_161 Hence, to date, the
bulk of arbitral decisions in the field of commercial arbitration
remains behind closed doors_162 Commercial arbitration's confidentiality thus makes it difficult, if not impossible, for disputants and their lawyers to decern and, if they so desire, contract
around any patterns of arbitral decision-making_163
The second reason commercial arbitration is not fully living
up to the contractual autonomy and efficiency standards is a lack
of stare decisis_164 Even if most arbitral awards were published, it
See supra note 159.
See Ben Jolley & Oliver Cook, Revised ICC Note to Parties and Tribunals: Will Publication of Awards Become the New Normal?, KLUWER ARB.
BLOG (Mar. 7, 2019), http:l/arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2019/03/07
/revised-icc-note-to-parties-and-tribunals-will-publication-of-awards-become-the
-new-normal/ [https://perma.cc/3XE6-3694] (explaining the opt-out system by
which a party can easily object to publication, in combination with the prevailing reluctance of participants to give up confidentiality).
16.2 NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 30 (6th ed. 2015) ('The once-general confidentiality of arbitral
proceedings has been eroded in recent years, but it still remains a key attraction of arbitration."); BORN, supra note 34, at 88 ("Arbitral hearings are virtually always closed to the press and public, and in practice both submissions
and awards often remain confidential, or at least private.").
163 See also BoRN, supra note 34, at 243 ("Although it has benefits, the confidentiality or privacy of the arbitral process is at the same time an obstacle
to practitioners, decision-makers and academics, all of whom frequently desire precedent, authority, or information about the arbitral process.'1; Mathias
Wittinghofer, The Award and the Courts, The Race Towards Predictability. Does
It Threaten the Effectiveness of Modern Arbitration?, in AUSTRIAN YEARBOOK
ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2017 219, 220--21 (Christian Klausegger et
a!. eds., 2017) (''Users want to know what is going to happen. Anyone who has
ever advised a client on an arbitration has ... the experience that clients want
to know exactly what the process is going to look like.").
164 See Weidemaier, supra note 17, at 1904; Stare Decisis, BLACK'S LAw
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining stare decisis as "[t]he doctrine of precedent,
under which a court must follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points
arise again in litigation').
100
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is unclear whether such a practice would necessarily flourish_165
This is because legal precedent does not exist in arbitration. 166
In principle, arbitrators decide the case before them without developing standards of conduct for anyone else but the disputants.167 In contrast, as court judgments are in principle reasoned
publicly, 1GB the doctrine of precedent in the common law of contracts allows courts to apply rules with a certain degree of predictabilityJ69
Notwithstanding, an arbitral practice of stare decisis is not
an impossibility.170 After all, while courts in civil law jurisdictions
have no legal obligation to follow other judicial decisions through
precedent either, they do heed a nonbinding standard, sometimes
referred to as ''jurisprudence constante," and strive for a uniform
application of the law. 171 Indeed, investment arbitration has shown
See id. at 1937-38.
BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 162, at 33 (''There is no system of binding
precedents in international arbitration-that is, no rule that means that an
award on a particular issue, or a particular set of facts, is binding on arbitrators confronted with similar issues or similar facts.").
167 Weidemaier, supra note 17, at 1904-05 (depicting this picture as ''folklore arbitration'}
16B See, e.g., Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir.
2006) (''The common law right of public access to judicial documents is firmly
rooted in our nation's history."); Union Oil Co. Cal. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 568
(7th Cir. 2000) ("People who want secrecy should opt for arbitration. When
they call on the courts, they must accept the openness that goes with subsidized dispute resolution by public (and publicly accountable) officials.").
169 See Payne v. Tenn., 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (stare decisis ''promotes
the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles,
fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process'~; see also Solum, supra note 66, at 329
("The fact patterns recur, opinions are published and particular rules governing omission types begin to form.").
110 See Weidemaier, supra note 17, at 1895.
171 See Irene M. Ten Cate, The Costs of Consistency: Precedent in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 418, 444 (2013). This
practice of an effective stare decisis for reasons of institutional policy or individual judges' dread to be reversed. See Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral
Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse? The 2006 Freshfields Lecture, 23 ARBITR.
INT. 357, 359 n.ll (2007) (calling this a quasi--J!tare decisis effect); see also
Annie Bersagel, Is There a Stare Decisis Doctrine in the Court of Arbitration for
Sport? An Analysis of Published Awards for Anti-Doping Disputes in Track
165
166
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arbitrators to follow significant awards in previous arbitration
cases.172 Also arbitral awards are published frequently and occasionally cited in later awards in maritime and sports arbitration_173
A similar practice exists in labor and securities arbitration in the
United States.174 Hence, in theory, arbitral legal reasoning could
amount to a de facto arbitral stare decisis_175
Nonetheless, a practice of stare decisis in commercial arbitration currently does not exist, and without widespread publication of arbitral awards, it is unlikely to develop either_176 Today,
therefore, unpublished arbitral awards neither legally nor effectively constrain future arbitrators' decision-making. Commercial
arbitration could have been or can be designed differently, as other
forms of arbitration prove.177 However, the current practice of
and Field, 12 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 189, 190 (2013) (referring to the civil
law approach to judicial precedent, which does not entail a strict obligation to
follow past decisions, as '5urisprudence constante'').
172 Kaufmann-Kohler, supra note 171, at 362 (''[T]he existing evidence, al·
though quite limited, suggests that international commercial arbitration features
a much less robust system of arbitral precedent than investment arbitration.');
see also Weidemaier, supra note 17, at 1909; Williaro W. Park, The Predictability
Paradox Arbitrators and Applicable Law, DOSSIER XI OF THE ICC INSTITUTE
OF WORLD BUSINESS LAW (ICC PUBUCATION NO. 753E) 64 n.35 (referencing
investment-state treaty).
173 BoRN, supra note 34, at 3032-33 ("[I]n some specialized market sectors
([for example,] maritime), institutional rules provide ... for publication of arbitral
awards unless the parties have agreed to the contrary."); id. at 3011 n.43
(citing the Court of Arbitration for Sport's procedural rules for anti-doping cases);
Weidemaier, supra note 17, at 1901 (showing confidence in at least a limited
form of arbitral precedence and accepting a form of precedent in arbitration to the
extent that arbitral awards are observable for future transactors).
174 See, e.g., Arbitration Awards Online, FINRA, https://www.fmra.org/arbi
tration-mediationlarbitration-awards [https://perma.cc/DU9A-E4DT]; Labor &
Employment Portfolio, LEXISNEXIS, https:/lwww.lexisnexis.com/en-us/products
/labor-employment·portfolio. page [https://perma.cc/6GTK-PPYP].
175 See ALEC STONE SWEET & FLoRIAN GRISEL, EvOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL
ARilrrRATION: JUDICIALIZATION, GoVERNANCE, LEGITIMACY 17-18 (1st ed. 2017)
(connecting the practice of reason giving to precedent-based lawmaking).
176 DOLORES BENTOULA, ARilrrR.ATORS AS LAWMAKERS 158 (2017) (''Arbitral
tribunals can only pay deference to past decisions if they have access to previous
arbitral awards in some way.'); Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Assimilation, 77
WASH. U. L.Q. 1053, 1053 (1999) [hereinafter Arbitration and Assimilation] (''In
short, arbitration can produce a sophisticated, comprehensive legal system,"
consisting of ''unwritten norms, written rules and decisional law.').
177 See Weidemaier, supra note 17, at 1958.
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commercial arbitration offers future transactors suboptimal commercial certainty_178 This diminishes parties' opportunity to control the arbitral decision-making process as they see fit_17 9 At least
in this respect, therefore, arbitration is not the better alternative
to court litigation on which the Supreme Court has based its broad
application of the FAAJBO
It could be said that if the lack of commercial certainty of
commercial arbitration is known, and business transactors still
prefer arbitration over litigation, then neither contractual autonomy
nor contractual efficiency is at stake.1 81 However, in terms of autonomy, when adjudicatory decision-making is difficult to predict, a
contract's silence on the matter does not necessarily indicate
consent to the otherwise prevailing default rulesJB2 Moreover,
parties may deem arbitration more efficient than court proceedings under certain circumstances_lsa However, such a cost-benefit
analysis does not mean that arbitration is as efficient as possible.
To exaggerate, choosing the lesser of two evils is not the optimal
choice.1 84
B. The Assessment of Damages as a Question of Fact

Commercial certainty in commercial arbitration practice is
especially important in respect to the calculation of compensatory
See id. at 1904.
See id.
100 See Mistaken Identity, supra note 52, at 132.
181 Sound of Silence, supra note 21, at 828 ("[B]y manil'esting their intention
to be legally bound, contracting parties are implicitly committing themselves to
the jurisdiction of a legal system that is thereby justified in using the background rules of contract law to fill the gaps in their agreement.'); id. at 861-62
(indicating tllat in that instance parties have consent to a court retaining its
jurisdiction to allocate tlle loss resulting from a transaction according to certain principles).
182 See Sound of Silence, supra note 21, at 872. If the costs of discovering
default rules are relatively high, the parties' silence might not signal assent
to whatever default rule will be applied, but rather a reluctant acceptance of tlle
potentially less costly risk of being confronted witll the enforcement of unwelcome default rules in dispute resolution. See id. at 866. Conversely, when these
costs are low, silence could very well indicate a "sufficient consensual basis
for enforcing tlle prevailing rule." Id. For these costs to be low enough, one may
extrapolate, default rules must be publicized. Id.
183 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011).
184 See Wittinghofer, supra note 163, at 221-22.
178
179
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damages in breach-of-contract cases_1B5 Business transactors do
not often include a liquidated damages clause in their contract
to determine in advance how the quantum of damages in case of
a breach is to be calculated.lB6 Liquidated damages clauses inform
a court or arbitration tribunal about the parties' actual intentions
on the consequences of parties breaching a contract_1B7 If parties
have not included such a clause in their contract, assessing damages comes down to adjudicatory decision-making.l 88
One could argue that the substantive contract law that parties choose to govern their contract may offer sufficient commercial
certainty. 189 After all, in the absence of liquidated damages clauses,
the valuation of damages is regulated by the terms supplied by
the applicable default rules_190 These default rules are generally
national laws, as parties to arbitration prefer the rules of national
contract law to govern their contract191 over transnational opt-in
instruments such as the UNIDROIT Principles of International
Contract Laws192 or the opt-out instruments of the Vienna Sales
Convention_193 In common law jurisdictions such as the United
States, one judicial default rule on damages expresses that the
primary remedy for a breach of contract is the compensation of
185
188

See Strategic Contractual Inefficiency, supra note 98, at 731.
Id. at 731 (''Most contracts are obligationally incomplete oo• because most

contracts do not have liquidated damages clauses.'}
187 Sound of Silence, supra note 21, at 903 (''[L]iquidated damages clauses oo•
reveal parties' actual preferences regarding the measure of recovery.").
188 See Strategic Contractual Inefficiency, supra note 98, at 731.
189 See id.
1oo Id. ("Courts, in determining the amount of damages for breach of contract, are often called upon to fill this obligational gap.").
191 This is also the case in cross-border arbitration. See INT'L CHAMBER
COM. 2019, supra note 159, at 15 ("Only 1% of contracts provided for the
application of rules or instruments other than national laws in their arbitration agreement or choice-of-law clause."); see also QUEEN MARY UNN. LoNDON
& SCH. OF INT'L ARB., 2010 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY: CHOICES IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBlTRATION 13 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY] (citing familiarity, predictability, foreseeability, and certainty
as the reasons why respondents chose a particular contract law).
192 INT'L INST. FOR UNIFICATION PRiv. L., UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 2016, XJcix (2016).
198 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, S. TREATY Doc. No. 98-9, 23 (1983) (entered into force
on January 1, 1988).
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the so-called "expectation" losses.194 Another such rule, originating
from the English Hadley v. Baxendale case, says that recovery of
damages for breach of contract is limited to foreseeable damages. 195
However, national contract law only offers commercial certainty if it is assumed that arbitrators apply the law in a manner sufficiently similar as a court within the jurisdiction of the
given governing law would.1 96 While some commentators observe
that arbitrators typically follow the chosen nationallaw,197 others disagree and deny that this is the predominant practice_198
Either way, even assuming arbitrators tend to follow judicial precedent, in the context of assessing damages, default rules
of the applicable national contract law would offer limited guidance_199 The reason is that the assessment of damages is not only a
question of law but also of fact, hence, leaving a significant degree
of discretion on the part of the individual court or arbitration
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 344 cmt. a, 347 cmt. a (Am.
L. Inst. 1979).
195 Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 145 (Exch. 1854) (''Where two
parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which
the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be
such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally.").
196 See, e.g., Kaufmann-Kobler, supra note 171, at 363--64 ("Indeed, the
rules embodied in commercial arbitral 'jurisprudence' ... are not creations of
arbitral case law per se. Arbitrators simply apply principles that prevail in
national laws and international treaties or general principles of law.'1.
197 Id.; BORN, supra note 34, at 4195 ("Judicial precedent applying a state's
laws should have the same binding effects in international arbitral proceedings
as it possesses in national court proceedings .... [T]he arbitrators' mandate is
to resolve the parties' dispute in an adjudicative manner, in accordance with
the applicable law.").
198 See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 720 (1998) (citing a
study indicating that arbitrators often do not feel compelled to apply the law
as much as they apply the terms of the contract); Paula Costa e Silva, Arbitral Precedent: Still Exploring the Path, KLUWER ARB. BLDG (2018), http://
arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/10/28/arbitral·precedent·still·ex
ploring-the·path/ [https://perma.cc/E9CT·DYSC]; Myriam Gilles, The Day Doctrine
Died: Private Arbitration and the End of Law, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 371, 411
("[A]rbitrators themselves are not bound to follow precedent, but instead, are
given wide latitude in their interpretation of legal concepts.'1 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
199 Gilles Cuniberti, Three Theories of Lex Mercatoria, 52 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 369, 409--10 (2014).
194
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tribunal deciding a claim.2oo On the one hand, the assessment of
damages can be said to present a question of law insofar it pertains to the measure of damages. 201 The measure is the basis for
calculating damages, 202 or rather, it tells us which losses might be
recovered. The measure of damages offers, expressly or implicitly,
the basic instructions for the formula by which the quantum of
damages is to be computed. 203 For example, whether a fair market value is the proper measure of damages can thus be said to
be a question oflaw.204 On the other hand, the subsequent calculation of the quantum of damages entails a question of fact.205 For
example, calculating the fair market value of a breached performance is a question of fact206 as this stage does not primarily involve applying the law.207 Instead, the calculation of the quantum
is in this respect an appraisal of the relevant circumstances, which
is steeped in the facts of a given case.2os
Without optimal predictability of the calculation of damages in arbitration, it is difficult for future transactors to predict
how well a claim for damages may fare in arbitration. 209 This
uncertainty compels them to incur either the transaction costs of
Id.
Measure of Damages, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
202 Id.
203 ld.
204 Rossner v. Idaho Forest Indus., 835 P.2d 648, 650 (Idaho 1992) (''Here
we perceive no genuine issue of material fact; the only issue ... is whether
Rossner's recovery should be the fair market value .... That issue is determinable as a matter of law.").
2o5 Brasch v. Quan, 986 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Or. App. 1999) (''Ascertainment
of damages generally is a question of fact.").
206 See, e.g., Basic Am., Inc. v. Shatila, 992 P.2d 175, 194 (Idaho 1999) ("A
determination of the proper measure of dsmages is a question of law .... Although
the calculation of damages in a trade secret case is a factual determination,
the formula used in making that calculation is a question of law.").
207 Brasch, 986 P.2d at 1184.
208 Id.; see also St. Louis Iron Mountain & S. Ry. v. Craft, 35 S. Ct. 704,
707 (1915) (''It involves only a question of fact, and is not open to reconsideration here."); Philip S. James, Measure of Damages in Contract and Tort-Law
and Fact, 13 Moo. L. REV. 36, 36 (1950) (''[T]he actual decision, since it turns
upon the cause of causes and the consequence of consequences must always
depend very largely upon the facts .... [D]amages at common law were always
a jury question.'1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
208 Limits of Contract Law, supra note 71, at 607.
2oo

2o1
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reducing this uncertainty by drafting a liquidated damages clause
or the costs of risking an unwelcome or erroneous arbitral valuation of the quantum of damages.21o
Hence, especially concerning the calculation of compensatory damages, lacking predictability of arbitral decision-making
contravenes the contractual autonomy and contractual efficiency
on which the U.S. Supreme Court premises its arbitration law
precedent.211 This situation asks for a solution.

C. Commercial Certainty Through "Rules of Regularity"
Empirical legal research can mitigate the suboptimal commercial certainty of arbitral decision-making.212 It can uncover
and articulate patterns in arbitral decision-making by quantitative analysis of arbitral awards and thus offer future transactors
needed clarity.21a This approach involves finding out under which
circumstances arbitrators tend to make which decisions.214 This can
be achieved, for example, through analyzing the co-occurrence
of, on the one hand, elements in the holding and reasoning found
in the language of the arbitral awards and, on the other hand, a
variety oflegal and extra -legal characteristics of the case. 215
The patterns of arbitration decision-making found through
empirical analysis are not regulatory rules but what will be called
''rules of regularity;" they do not prescribe but describe patterns
of arbitral decision-making. 216 The difference between regulatory
rules and rules of regularity echoes H.L.A. Hart's famous distinction between rules in the normative and the descriptive sense,
the former seen from the viewpoint of a participant of a given
social practice, the latter from an outside observer's vantage
Id.
Costa e Silva, supra note 198.
212 Emad H. Atiq, Legal vs. Factual Normative Questions & the True Scope
210

2n

oflling, 32 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS & PuB. POL'¥ 47, 57 (2018).

Id. at 71.
Costa e Silva, supra note 198 \'We concluded this by considering that
the contractual nature of the arbitration agreement does not exclude arbitral
decisions from the jurisdictional system and the Law of the country, when the
arbitrator is bound to decide by applying such Law: in such case, arbitrators
both interpret, apply and create Law.'1.
215 Atiq, supra note 212, at 65.
21s Costa e Silva, supra note 198.
218

214
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point.217 Rules from the internal perspective have normative force
as a standard for human behavior.21s Rules from the external
vantage point merely describe observed regularities of human behavior219 or the consistency of events.22o As a result, while the
application of regulatory rules might appear dichotomic-they
purportedly apply or not-the applicability of rules of regularity
is a matter of probability. 221 The rules of regularity give the likelihood that arbitrators would take a particular decision under
certain circumstances.222
Rules of regularity perform a similar function as default
rules.22a They may supply the same commercial certainty through
empirical analysis that default rules do through doctrinal analysis.224 As a result, future parties can predict the likelihood of
arbitral decisions ex post, and either accept or contract around these
practices ex ante.225 By allowing them to make better-informed
strategic choices when negotiating and drafting, their contracts,
rules of regularity can thus advance contractual autonomy and
efficiency like judicial defaults do. 22a
Articulating arbitration's rules of regularity problem empirically fits well in the Empirical Legal Studies ("ELS'') tradition.
ELS can provide insights into the ''law in action'' that a doctrinal
217 H.L.A. HART ET AL., THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89 (3d ed. 2012) ("[F]or it is
possible to be concerned with the rules, either merely as an observer who does
not himself accept them, or as a member of the group which accepts and uses
them as guides to conduct. We may call these respectively the 'external' and the
'internal points of view."'). It is commonly thought that internal statements
express the acceptance of a rule, while external statements merely state facts.
See id. at 102--03; see also Scott Shapiro, What Is the Internal Point of Vzew?,
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1157, 1165 (2006) [hereinafter Internal Point of View].
218 Stephen Perry, Hart on Social Rules and the Foundations of Law: Liberating the Internal Point of Vzew, 75 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1171, 1172 (2006) (saying
about Hart's internal viewpoint, "[t]hose who accept the rule regard the pattern of behavior as a common and binding standard of conduct'').
219 HART ET AL., supra note 217, at 55.
220 Id.
221 Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Empiricism, Experimentalism, and
Conditional Theory, 67 SMU L. REV. 141, 162 (2014).
222 Internal Point of View, supra note 217, at 1169.
22a Id.
22• Atiq, supra note 212, at 90.
225 Limits of Contract Law, supra note 71, at 586.
226 Arbitration and Assimilation, supra note 176, at 744--45.
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analysis or even an economic model cannot offer. 227 ELS scholarship has endeavored, for example, to uncover the degree to which
judges or Supreme Court Justices are influenced by various ideological or other nonlegal factors.22s However, the method proposed in this Article does not imply that doctrinal scholarship
naively perceives judicial decision-making as a matter of mere
deductive reasoning229 or that legal doctrine has little bearing on
actual judicial decision-making.2ao The method proposed merely
seeks to uncover patterns of arbitral decision-making that otherwise remain concealed.2a1
227 See Christina L. Boyd, In Defense of Empirical Legal Studies Response,
63 BUFF. L. REV. 363, 363 (2015) (citing Theodore Eisenberg in saying that
"empirical studies can inform policymakers and the public''); Franck, supra
note 15, at 770 ("Empirical methodologies can provide opportunities to make
more informed policy choices and offer additional information about international law matters.").
22s See Carolyn Shapiro, The Context of Ideology: Law, Politics, and Empirical Legal Scholarship, 75 Mo. L. REV. 79, 86--87 (2010) [hereinafter Context
of Ideology] (providing an overview of pertinent literature).
229 See, e.g., Sisk et al., supra note 13, at 1498 ("For adherents to the legal
model of judging-impartiality, objectivity, suppression of personal experiences and attitudes, and exclusive attention to legal doctrine and rules-this
study may be a sobering splash in the face with cold reality.''). For criticism of the
ELS in this respect, see Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Distorting Slant in Quantitative Studies of Judging, 50 B.C. L. REV. 685, 687 (2009) (''The judicial politics field developed as a reaction to formalist views of judging .... It turns out,
however, that much of this conventional story is false."); also see Context of
Ideology, supra note 228, at 126 (arguing that empirical legal scholarship tends
to presume ideology as a crucial factor in Supreme Court decision making).
230 For criticism of the ELS in this respect, for an example see Victoria Nourse
& Gregory Shaffer, Empiricism, Experimentalism, and Conditional Theory,
67 SMU L. REV. 141, 145 (2014) (arguing that "traditional'' legal realism neglects
to acknowledge the significance of law's normativity); Sisk et al., supra note
13, at 1384; Gregory C. Sisk, Quantitative Moment and the Qualitative Opportunity: Legal Studies of Judicial Decision Making Book Review, 93 CORNELL
L. REV. 873, 877 (2007) ("Empirical study of the courts should remain a mainstay of legal scl10larship .... However, theoretical and doctrinal work will never
be supplanted."); also see Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls
of Empirical Studies that Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1900 (2008) (arguing that empirical
scholars have ignored extra-legal factors specific to appellate decision-making,
which involves panel deliberations); Coding Complexity, supra note 13, at 482
(attempting to compensate for scholarship neglecting legal factors impacting
judges' decisions by "exploring ways to incorporate law and legal doctrine into
empirical legal scholarship").
2s1 Internal Point of View, supra note 217, at 1166.
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The rules of regularity to be uncovered are also not necessarily preferred by any autonomy or efficiency-based theory of
contract law.232 Once a pattern of arbitral decision-making is revealed, the resulting rule of regularity describes how things
(likely) are, not how they should be. 233 In fact, empirical research like the one presented in Part III is a prerequisite for
subsequent critical analysis based on normative theories of contract law.234

Ill.

PROOF OF CONCEPT: THE ARBITRAL ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES

A. Key Findings: Three Rules of Regularity
The case study presented next offers a straightforward
proof of concept, showing how empirical legal research can find
patterns of arbitration decision-making and articulate rules of
regularity. Given the particular significance of predictability for
assessing damages, as discussed previously, this study concentrates on obtaining rules of regularity on the calculation of the
quantum of compensatory damages in cross-border breach-ofcontract disputes.235 The underlying dataset makes up 284 separate heads of claims in 180 confidential unpublished arbitral
awards given between 2014 and 2018 under the auspices of the
International Court of Arbitration in Paris and New York City.
This study offers descriptive statistics, including inferential factor analysis using co-occurrence matrices to corroborate or
challenge hypotheses and explanations in scholarly and anecdotal
commentary.236 The research aims not to prove causal relations
between factors of disputes and arbitral decision-making. Instead,
the study elucidates under which circumstances arbitrators will
Id. at 1169.
Cf. Atiq, supra note 212, at 49 (nuancing the distinction between questions of law and questions of fact); see also Internal Point of View, supra note
217, at 1169 (''For Hart, a social rule just is a social practice and, hence, to say
that the rule of recognition exists is simply to state that a certain regularity
of behavior is generally accepted as a standard of conduct.").
284 See infra Part Ill.
235 See infra Part III.
236 See infra Section III. C.
282

233
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likely decide on the calculation of damages which the parties can
opt out of through contractual arrangements. 237
The proof of concept produces three patterns of arbitral
decision-making, correlating substantive law and procedural decisions with the methods of calculating the quantum, the tribunal
composition, and the engagement of quantum experts on the success of a claim for damages. 238 The resulting rules of regularity
will read as follows:
Unless the parties agree otherwise,
• arbitrators are more likely to award a higher percentage
of the claimed quantum in case of reliance damages than
expectation damages regardless of whether the dispute case
is connected to civil law or common law;
• sole arbitrators are more likely to award a higher percentage
of the claimed quantum than three-person panels; and
• engaging a quantum expert is likely more beneficial for
the claimant if the respondent does not appoint an expert,
but the least helpful when both parties do. 239

As said, unearthing patterns of arbitral decision-making

when a contract is silent on a matter performs a similar predictability function that default rules do. 240 Hence, Part III will conclude by suggesting how future transactors can consider these
findings ex ante-when negotiating and drafting damages and
arbitration clauses-and contract out of these rules of regularity
if they wish.241

B. Methodology
The following overview captures the research design for
the present case study to explain the basic method for an empirical study to find rules ofregularity.242
Variable Selection. This case study takes as its primary
dependent variable, or variable datum, the success of a claim for
237 See infra Section III. C.
••• See infra Section III.D.
••• See infra Section III.D.
240 See supra Section II. C.
241 See infra Section !II.D.
242 See infra Section III. C.
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damages, expressed as the percentage of the claimed amount that
the arbitral tribunal243 eventually awarded.244 In addition, various
independent variables were selected to examine which factors related to the calculation of the quantum of damages may affect the
success of a claim for damages. On such independent variable was
the valuation approaches used by the arbitrators to calculate the
quantum of the damages. 245 Another independent variable involved the laws connected to a case-including the parties' choice of
governing law, the lex arbitri (the arbitration laws of the jurisdiction where the procedure was geographically situated). 246 Further independent variables included the arbitrators' likely legal
background;247 the number of arbitrators (i.e., whether the parties
chose a sole arbitrator or a three-person arbitration panel);248
and if one or both of the parties engaged, or the tribunal appointed,
an expert in the assessment of damages.249
Coding scheme. Coding the relevant data required various
degrees of interpretation. The valuation methods presented concepts that required generalization because arbitral tribunals
often did not use specialized terminology to identify the valuation method in question.250 The coding scheme and the variable
248 In Part III, the term ''tribunal" will be used to refer to both sole arbitrators and multi-person panels. See 2021 Rules of Arbitration art. 2, INTL CHAMBER
COM. [hereinafter 2021 Rules of Arbitration], https:/liccwbo.org/dispute-resolu
tion-services/arbitration!rules-of-arbitrationl#article_2 [https://perma.cc/5RH4G6W3] ("'n the Rules: (I) 'arbitral tribunal' includes one or more arbitrators.");
INT'L CENTRE FOR DISP. RESOL., INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRoCEDURES 20 (2014) (stipulating with regard to ''The Tribunal" that "[i]f the
parties have not agreed on the number of arbitrators, one arbitrator shall be
appointed unless the Administrator determines in its discretion that three
arbitrators are appropriate").
244 See infra Section III. C.
245 See infra Section III. C.l.
246 See infra Section III.C.l.
247 See infra Section III.C.l.
24B See infra Section III.C.2.
249 See infra Section III.C.3.
260 See infra Section III.C.l. In fact, the empirical research underlying this
Article's case study reveals that only eight percent of the heads of claim in the
dataset were decided by arbitrators that expressly used common valuation
methods based on which the variables were chosen. The author deliberated
the categories to be used for recording the arbitral methods for calculation
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selection were introduced to a focus group of international experts in damages valuation in intemational commercial and investment arbitration and revised where needed. 251 The resulting
code book was then tested on several cases to check for the categories' mutual exclusivity.
Data Collection. The author conducted the data collection
in person at the International Court of Arbitration's Secretariat
in North America ("SICANA'') in New York City252 and the ICC
headquarters in Paris aided by selected student assistants.253 The
author performed the research as a PwC Research Fellow at the
School of International Arbitration at the Queen Mary University
of London. 254
the quantum of damages, and the underlying theoretical considerations, with
representatives from PwC, namely Matt Fritzsche, Director Forensic Services;
Sarah Johnson, Senior Manager Forensic Accounting; and Tim Allen, Partner
of PwC. Neither these individuals nor anyone at PwC had access, nor requested access, to the awards or other information underlying the study.
261 The focus group consisted of Professor Victor Goldberg, Columbia Law
School; Alice Fremuth-Wolf, Vienna International Arbitral Centre; Matthew
Weiniger QC, Linklaters; Professor Mark Feldman, Peking University, School
of Transnational Law; Dr. Remy Gerbay, Queen Mary University of London;
Sophie Nappert, independent international arbitrator; Herfried Wiiss, Wiiss
& Partners SC; Annette Magnusson, The Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm
Chamber of Commerce; Mark Kantor, Arbitrator and mediator; Jacomijn van
Haersolte-van Hof, London Court of International Arbitration; Laurence Shore,
BonelliErede; Professor Ioannis Kokkoris, Queen Mary University of London;
Javier Rubinstein, King & Spalding.
262 See Contact SICANA, INT'L CHAMBER COM., https://iccwbo.org/contact-us
/contact-sicana/ [https://perma.cc/KTP3-RTLR].
253 The research assistants were carefully chosen students in the Queen
Mary University of London's LLM program in Paris, France. See LLM (Master
of Laws) in Paris, QUEEN MARY UNN. LONDON, https:l/london.ac.uk/institute
-in-paris/study/postgraduate-degree-courses/lim-master-laws-paris-queen-mary
[https://perma.cc/29HY-HC6D]. They were Ali Emir Bagis, Sinem Buyukkececi,
Sophie Courville-La Bouyonnec, Maline Fourmont, Lucy Gustav and Sonal
Salwi. Id.
264 See School of International Arbitration, QUEEN MARY UNN. LoNDON,
https://arbitration.qmul.ac.uk [https://perma.cc/S326-X8LL]. The study was conducted under the auspices of Professor Loukas Mistelis, Clive M. Schmitthoff
Professor of Transnational Commercial Law and Arbitration and the Director
of the School of International Arbitration at the Centre for Commercial Law
Studies, Queen Mary University of London. A report presenting alternative
descriptive statistics that the author derived from this quantitative study, yet
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Selection criteria. The data for this study were retrieved from
a content analysis of the arbitral awards' language and details
in the case managers' records. 255 First, the sample population was
selected from a pool of all ICC awards from January 2014 to May
2018. 256 Excluded from the sample set were awards for which the
ICC Court was not permitted to provide access due to a heightened level of confidentiality. 257 From the remaining pool of arbitral
awards, the author only requested those drafted in the English
language258 containing the word "damages." From the over seven
hundred distinct procedures that remained, the author then further selected those cases in which the arbitrators engaged in a
valuation of the quantum of damages claims. This selection thus
excluded awards in which claims were rejected based on the
grounds of jurisdiction or liability questions, or those in which
damages were awarded without addressing the valuation altogether. It did include awards in which the tribunal awarded no
or only nominal damages, but only if that was the outcome of a
quantum valuation. 259 Combined, these selection criteria resulted in
a sample population of 180 relevant awards, making up 284 separate heads of claims from claimants and respondents' counterclaims.260 U.S. law was most often the governing law (thirty-two
not pertallring specifically to the question of commercial certainty in arbitration, was published late 2020. See PR!CEWATERHOUSECOOPERS ILl', DAMAGES
AWARDS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION A STUDY OF ICC AWARDS
3 (Dec. 2020). The ICC launched this report during a webinar on December 10,
2020, where the study's fmdings were discussed by an expert panel including
Sophie Nappert, Kathleen Paisly, Laurence Shore, and Herfried Wi:iss. See
ICC Activities, INT'L CHAMBER COM., https:l/library.iccwbo.org/dr-iccactivities
.htm [https://perma.cc/HVW2-3RDR].
266 See infra Section III. C.
266 See ICC Digital Library, supra note 157.
267 Marlon Meza·Salas, Confidentiality in International Commercial Arbitration: Truth or Fiction?, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Sept. 23, 2018), http://arbitra
tionblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/09/23/confidentiality-in-international-com
mercial·arbitration·truth·Or-fiction/ [https://perma.cc/QX4J-D4B4].
268 A single language would allow a uniform interpretation, coding, and anal·
yses of the data, while English was the single language shared among the author,
his patrons, and his research assistants.
259 See infra Section III. C.
260 See infra Section III. C. In this respect, whenever the following findings
refer to "claimant," these can refer to either the claimant or the respondent if
the claim studied was a counterclaim.
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cases), predominantly the law of the State of New York (nineteen cases).261
Representativeness. The sample population comes to eight
percent of the total population of all ICC awards in the selected
period and gives a representative distribution of the population
of ICC awards. Comparing various fmdings with the ICC's general
statistics shows that the data sample corresponds to the general
population's features critical to this study. For example, the 2018
ICC Dispute Resolution Statistics262 says that most cases in 2018
involved an amount between $2 million (USD) and $30 million
(USD) in dispute.263 Correspondingly, the median amount in dispute in this study's sample population is $11 million (USD).264
Furthermore, the same ICC Court statistics report that 58% of cases
in 2018 involved a three-member panel, and 42% a sole arbitrator.265 That ratio is similar to the study's sample population: 66%
versus 34%, respectively.266 On the other hand, the ICC Court Statistics diverges slightly on the parties' nationalities and applicable
laws.267 The fact that this study includes awards drafted in the
English language alone likely explains this divergence. 268 In addition, the sample population may be said to give a representative
distribution of the population of arbitral awards in cross-border
commercial disputes more generally.269 While the ICC Court is one
of several prominent arbitration institutions globally, it is the oldest
See infra Section III.C.l.
ICC Digital Library, supra note 157.
26s Id.
264 See infra Section III.C.3.
265 See INT'L CHAMBER COM. 2019, supra note 159, at 10.
266 See id. The ICC statistics also reveal that the gender ratio among arbitrators in 2018 was between 1 to 4 and 1 to 5. Id. at 5. The ratio for arbitrators in
cases included in this study gives the same result. See id.
267 See id. For example, the parties in the study's sample population most
often chose the United States (22%), the United Kingdom (18%), France (18%),
Switzerland (17%), and Singapore (7%) as the seat of arbitration and thus the
respective local lex arbitri. Id. at 8-9. In comparison, the general ICC statistics for 2018 include Brazil in the top three, while no case in this study was
seated in Brazil. Id. at 9. Likewise, while the same ICC statistics as this case
study records arbitrators as most often originating from the United States, the
United Kingdom, and France, arbitrators from Latin America and the Caribbean
are represented more significantly in the ICC statistics than in the cases included in this study. See id. at 11.
26B Id. at 13.
269 Id.
261
262
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and widely considered to be the leading institution in the world in
terms of its caseload, size of the amounts in dispute, the number
and spread of countries where its arbitration takes place, and its
leading role in developing institutional rules of procedure. 270

C. Quantitative Analyses
1. The Claim's Success per Measure of Damages
The case study's first probe is directed at correlating the
claimant's valuation approach and the claim's success.271 This
will be the most elaborate of the three parts of the study.
The first step is to examine how receptive an arbitral tribunal is to a party's valuation approach in cases where the con·
tract does not contain a liquidated damages clause providing a
calculation formula.272 The case study distinguishes between four
approaches to the calculation of quantum: (1) income-based, (2)
sunk-cost, (3) market-based, and (4) asset-based approaches to value
and calculate damages.273 Income-based approaches to valuing damages calculate the bargain's hypothetical future benefits were it
not for the breach.274 The income approach assesses the loss in
future business and loss of profits due to a contract breach.275 It
is generally deemed most appropriate when future cash flow and
transactional risk can be assessed with sufficient confidence on
present data.276 Methods within this approach aim to assess the
270 See ALEC STONE SWEET & FLoRIAN GRISEL, THE EvOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION JUDICIALIZATION, GovERNANCE, LEGITIMACY 45-47 (2017)
(presenting data illustrating the leading position of the ICC Court as a global
arbitration center in terms of caseload, the size of the amount disputes, and
the geographical range in seats of arbitration combined); BORN, supra note
34, at 197 (observing that the ICC Court is "generally described as the world's
leading international commercial arbitration institution.").
271 Alexander Demuth, Income Approach and the Discounted Cash Flow
Methodology, in GUIDE TO DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 194, 195
(John A. Trenor ed., 2018).
272 Id. at 209.
273 Mark W. Friedman & Floriane Lavaud, Damages Principles in Invest·
ment Arbitration, in GUIDE TO DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 93,
102-03 (John A. Trenor ed., 2018).
274 Demuth, supra note 271, at 201.
275 Id. at 197.
276 Philip Haberman & Liz Perks, Overview of Methodologies for Assessing
Fair Market Value, in GUIDE TO DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
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present value of a company's future net cash flow to value a business's value. The income approach is also suitable for determining damages in breach of contract disputes.277 For example, the
discounted cash flow (''DCF') is perceived as a common and popular calculation method to account for the time value of money278
when assessing a company's or a transaction's future cash flows.279
Furthermore, the sunk-cost or wasted-cost approach is based on historical costs. 280 The methods belonging to this approach are the
historic investment in a business, which is particularly relevant
in expropriation, mergers and acquisitions, and wasted expenditures, which included all investments made into a breached contract, such as capital already actually invested in the transaction
that now has gone array or the costs incurred by counteracting
the situation caused by the breach.2Bl Then, a market-based approach values a transaction by assessing the value of actualand sometimes hypothetical-comparable transactions, so-called
"comparables."282 Commenters observe that this method may be
appealing to arbitrators when an income-based approach using a
DCF method seems too speculative.2sa Lastly, the asset- or costbased approaches value an asset based on their book or replacement
176, 182 (John A. Trenor ed., 2018); David Saunders et al., The Applicable
Valuation Approach, in GUIDE TO DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
186, 186 (John A. Trenor ed., 2018).
277 Demuth, supra note 271, at 194.
278 Based on the notion that a dollar is worth more today than tomorrow
because it can be invested and generate an interest rate. As hypothetical future
profits are considered to include such investment value, this amount must be
reduced to prevent overcompensation, in other words, profiting from the investment value twice. See How Does Discounted CiMh Flow (DCF) Analysis Work?,
PITCHBOOK (Oct. 8, 2021), https://pitchbook.comlblog/how-discounted-cashtl.ow
-analysis-works [https://perma.cc/JZ3V-3W2S].
279 See Haberman & Perks, supra note 276, at 180; Demuth, supra note
271, at 195.
280 See Ermelinda Beqiraj & Tim Allen, Assessing Damages for Breach of
Contract, in GUIDE TO DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 155, 167 (John
A. Trenor ed., 2018).
281 Id. at 171.
282 Haberman & Perks, supra note 276, at 180--81; Saunders et al., supra
note 276, at 187; Friedman & Lavaud, supra note 273, at 102.
288 See, e.g., Friedman & Lavaud, supra note 273, at 102 (referring to the
famouB-Qr infamous-Yukos Universal Ltd. (Isle of Man) v. Russian Fed'n, PCA
Case Repository No. AA 227, Final Award, '1['1[1785--87 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2014)).
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value, in other words, measuring the difference between the assets
and liabilities on the books.284
The literature does not offer a single hypothesis about
whether the valuation approach may affect a damages claim's
success.285 Various commentators have observed that arbitrators
tend to be skeptical of forward-looking valuation approaches, particularly the DCF method's potential to be too speculative.286 Compared to the backward-looking historical or sunk-cost methods,
techniques used in an income-based approach to valuation are
considered forward-looking, especially when involving the DCF
method.287 The DCF method is sometimes perceived as offering
less certainty when there is a lack of track record to base an estimated future gain. 288 On the other hand, a 2015 survey recorded
284 Haberman & Perks, supra note 276, at 181-82; Saunders et al., supra
note 276, at 187; Friedman & Lavaud, supra note 273, at 102.
285 Haberman & Perks, supra note 276, at 181-82.
288 Friedman & Lavaud, supra note 273, at 101 (''Tribunals' willingness to
apply the DCF analysis typically depends on whether there is a sufficient basis
to estimate future cash flows, and numerous tribunals have rejected application of the DCF analysis where projections are deemed too speculative."). For
examples of such skepticism on the part of arbitration tribunals, see Benoit
Chappuis & Sebastiana Nessi, Assessing Damage Under the Discounted Cash
Flow Approach (DCF): Sound Tool or Speculative Method? A Swiss Perspective, 84 REV. SUISSE DROIT AFF. MARCHE FIN. 269, 279, 282 (2012).
287 Chappuis & Nessi, supra note 286, at 277; Woss ET AL., supra note 16,
at 6.151. The market-based approach can be both forward and backward·
looking. See Jose Alberro & Paul Zurek, Market Approach or Comparables, in
GUIDE TO DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 224, 231 (John A. Trenor
ed., 2018) ("[S]ome academic literature has found forward-looking multiples
[such as multiples that use forecasted future earnings] to be more accurate in
explaining equity prices than multiples based on historical performance."). The
asset-based approach can also be used in backward or forward-looking valua·
tiona. See Wbss ET AL., supra note 16, at 6.218 ("[T]he book value of a busi·
ness is based on the purchase price or a capital expenditure value on fixed
assets and is thus backward-looking in nature.'); Chappuis & Nessi, supra note
286, at 275 n.59.
288 Friedman & Lavaud, supra note 273, at 101 (''Where an investment is a
start-up with no track record, history of performance or other solid bases on
which to make projections of profits, a tribunal may decide not to apply the
DCF analysis.'); Anthony Charlton, Asset Based Methods-Part 3, Valuation
and the Financial Crisis, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (2012), http://arbitrationblog
.kluwerarbitration.com/2012/04/10/asset-based-methods-part-3-valuation-and
-the-financial-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/2SY2-NEBD] (mentioning the "uncertainties
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a possible uptick in the usage of income-based valuations in investment arbitration because arbitrators are said to have become
increasingly familiarized with, and thus more confident, using
forward-looking valuation methods.2B9
Table 1 provides insight into the possible correlation between the claimant's valuation approach and the claim's success
through the arbitral tribunal's appreciation of this approach when
the contract did not include a liquidated damages clause.290
TABLE 1: TRIBUNAL'S CRITICISM OF CLAIMANT'S
CALCULATION OF QUANTUM
IncomeBased

AssetBased

MarketBased

Sunk
Cost

No criticism

86 (60%)

9 (75%)

16 (64%)

237 (73%)

Wrong assumptions

18 (13%)

1 (8%)

3 (12%)

21 (6%)

Claimant's valuation approach
Tribunal's criticism*

Speculative claims

10 (7%)

0 (0%)

3 (12%)

14 (4%)

Lack of evidence

28 (20%)

2 (17%)

3 (12%)

54 (17%)

142 (100%)

12 (100%)

25 (100%)

326 (100%)

TOTAL

* Number of claims and percentage per valuation approach split

Table 1 suggests tribunals were somewhat more critical of
income-based than sunk-cost approaches that claimants took to
calculate the quantum of damages. Here, the table includes three
points of criticism tribunals most often expressed about how claimants conducted a chosen valuation approach.29l These include
objections against the claimant drawing incorrect assumptions,
inherent in a forward-looking DCF, especially if the monies spent had not had
time to demonstrate their revenue generating capacity").
289 PwC RESEARCH 2015, supra note 15, at 17 CThe increased use of forwardlooking approaches may be a reflection of tribunals becoming more conversant
with these approaches, and therefore more willing to accept that, despite their
inherent uncertainties, they can produce a reasonable result.").
200 See supra Table 1.
291 See supra Table 1. Other points of criticism that tribunals expressed (much)
less, include calculations having errors or inconsistencies or committing a
case of double counting, in other words, including the same losses twice under
different headings. See supra Table 1.
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the valuation being too speculative, or the claimant presenting
insufficient evidence to support the factual assertions underpinning the calculation. 292 Table 1 shows that the sunk-cost approach
receives the most criticisms in absolute numbers, 293 but that is
explained by the fact that the claims in the dataset more often
involved a sunk-cost approach (180 claims) than an income approach (82 claims). 294 Instead, the distribution of criticisms per
valuation method indicates a bigger share of claimants' sunk-cost
calculation received no objection at all (73%) than is the case with
income-based analyses (60%).295 Moreover, the segment of incomebased calculations that tribunals considered speculative (7%) or
based on unsound assumptions (13%) are twice as large as the
share of sunk-cost calculations that received the same criticisms
(4% and 6%, respectively).296
A way of confirming whether the suggested arbitral disinclination to income-based valuations is looking to the ensuing
success of the claim for each valuation approach, which Table 2
addresses.

See supra Table 1.
See supra Table 1. The total number of points of criticism per valuation
approach may exceed the total number of claims in the dataset because per
valuation methods up to two different criticisms, if applicable, were recorded.
See supra Table 1.
294 See supra Table 1. Likewise, the low absolute number of criticisms by
tribunals expressed for market and asset-based calculation is due to the relatively
few claims in the dataset were calculated based on these approaches (fourteen
and seven claims, respectively). See supra Table 1.
295 See supra Table 1. The unrounded percentage for this category is 60.6%.
However, the percentage is rounded down to avoid a rounding error in the sum
of percentage points for the four criticisms of the income approach. See supra
Table 1.
296 See supra Table 1.
292
298
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TABLE 2: SUCCESS OF CLAIM PER CLAIMANT'S
VALUATION APPROACH

Claimant's valuation approach

IncomeBased

AssetBased

MarketBased

Sunk

47%

73%

59%

55%

57

9

11

16

1

3

162
18

Cost

The success of the claim

Awarded partially (percentage)*
Awarded in full (number of claims)
Awarded at nil (number of claims)

* Percentages showing portion of claimed quantum that was awarded on average

Table 2 depicts the average portion of the claimed damages
per valuation method used by the claimant, as well as the number of awards within that dataset that were awarded in full or at
niL The data show that for partially awarded claims, income-based
calculations resulted in a lower portion of the claimed quantum
being awarded (47%) than was the case with sunk-cost calculations (55%)_ 297 Moreover, whereas for the income-based calculation approach, the ratio of claims awarded in full and those at nil
is 8:2 (57 versus 16 claims), the ratio for sunk-cost calculations
is 9:1 (162 versus 18 claims).29B
In sum, Tables 1 and 2 show that in the absence of a liquidated damages clause stipulating the calculation method, tribunals criticize claimants' income-based calculation methods slightly
more often than sunk-cost calculation and award, on average, a
lower portion of the claimed quantum that is calculated by the
former approach than the latter. Hence, arbitrators appear generally
more skeptical of so-called ''forward-looking'' than of ''backwardlooking'' valuation methods. 299 Nonetheless, the differences in
arbitral criticisms of income-based and sunk-cost approaches might
not prove as stark as postulated in the previously discussed scholarly and anecdotal commentary. aoo
See supra Table 2. The percentages are higher for quantum calculated
through a market (59%) or asset approach (73%), but these outcomes are less
significant than the other two categories, given the small number of cases that
pertain to these approaches (fourteen and ten, respectively). See supra Table 2.
298 See supra Table 2.
298 See Chappuis & Nessi, supra note 286, at 277; Alberro & Zurek, supra
note 287, at 231.
soo See supra Section III.C.2.
297
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Still, the picture of the relationship between the claimants' valuation approach and the claim's success for damages is
incomplete without taking account of the type of damages being
claimed.301 Neither parties nor the tribunal chooses their valuation methods randomly.ao2 The calculation method, a question of
fact, is intricately connected to the measure of damages, a question oflaw. 303 This connection was discussed in more detail earlier,
both in this Section when introducing the four valuation approaches
included in this case study, and Section II.B with respect to the
nature of assessment of damages questions. 304 Therefore, it is worth
correlating a claim's success with the measure of damages.
Here, four variables were coded to distinguish between various measures of damages claimed: (1) the aggrieved party's expectation interest or lucrum cessessans; (2) its reliance interest
or damnum emergens; (3) its restitution interest; and (4) punitive
damages.305 The first two variables should capture both the concepts of expectation and reliance damages used in common law
jurisdictions, and lucrum cessessans, and damnum emergens, respectively, specific to civil law jurisdictions that received Roman
law. 306 Compensating a victim's expectation interest or lucrum
cessessans brings that party in the position it would have been if
the contract were correctly performed.307 Expectation interests include profits it would have gained if not for the breach.aos Compensation of reliance losses or damnum emergens is understood to
bring the victim in the position it would have been in had the contract never been concluded.309 In contrast, reliance interest includes
Friedman & Lavaud, supra note 273, at 102-03.
See Clare Connellan et a!., Compensatory Damages Principles in Civil
and Common Law Jurisdictions: Requirements, Underlying Principles and
Limits, in GUIDE TO DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 7, 20 (John A.
Trenor ed., 2018).
sos See id.
304 See supra Section II.B.
305 See Connellan et a!., supra note 302, at 19--20.
306 As an example for France, see Woss ET AL., supra note 16, at 4.190;
Connellan et a!., supra note 302, at 20 (emphasizing that a valuer will explore a
variety of approaches and will either pick the most suitable one or use several
methods to weigh against one another).
307 See David W. Barnes, The Net Expectation Interest in Contract Damages,
48 EMORYL.J. 1143, 1146 (1999).
30B See id.
809 See Connellan eta!., supra note 302, at 19.
301
302
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costs incurred either from already having invested in the broken
deal or costs made owing to the breach.310 Furthermore, restitution interest is understood to represent an aggrieved party's interest in being compensated for being wronged by the fact that the
other party has enjoyed a windfall due to its breach. au Damages
awarded on these grounds aim to have the breaching party disgorge whatever value he gained by the transaction and prevent
unjust enrichment. 312 Lastly, punitive damages stand for an obligation to compensate the aggrieved party for an amount so high
that it in effect punishes the party breaching the contract, which
is generally rejected in common law jurisdictions as a rare mandatory contract rule.a1a Damages are punitive when, for example,
enforcing a penalty or liquidated damages clause in the contract
would overcompensate the aggrieved party.314
Table 3 shows that claims for damages that seek to protect the claimant's reliance interest appear more successful than
those protecting its expectation interest.
TABLE 3: SUCCESS OF CLAIM PER MEASURE OF DAMAGES
Measure of Damages
Success of claim
Awarded partially (percentage)*
Awarded in full (number of claims)
Awarded at nil (number of claims)

Expectation Damages

Reliance Damages

47%

57%

76

153
19

20

* Percentages showing portion of claimed quantum that was awarded on average

Like Table 2, Table 3 depicts the average portion of the
claimed damages, as well as the number of awards therewithin
that were awarded in full or at nil, yet this time correlated with
810

See id.

au See id. at 26.
312 See Barnes, supra note 307, at 1149; WOSS ET AL., supra note 16, at 4.126.
818 See Connellan et al., supra note 302, at 27.
314 See Richard Craswell, Freedom of Contract, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN
LAW AND ECONOMICS 81, 81 (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000). For an economic analysis of the difficulty in decicting on a hypothetical liquidated damages clause
as a default rule, see Schwartz, supra note 108, at 408--09. A court's determi·
nation of whether a liquidated-damages clause is punitive involves the expectancy interest default rule as benchmark. See Limits of Contract Law, supra
note 71, at 616--17.
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the measure of the damages claimed. The data show that when
a claimed quantum is awarded only partially, a lower portion is
awarded on average of claims for expectation damages (47%) than
for reliance damages (57%). In addition, while for expectation dam·
ages, the ratio of claims awarded in full and those at nil is 8:2
(76 versus 20 claims), the ratio for reliance damages is 9:1 (153 ver·
sus 19 claims). 315 The share of claims for expectation damages
awarded at nil is thus twice as large as the same share for reli·
ance damages. 316
These findings suggest a strong correlation between the
measure of damages and the valuation approaches, at least in
terms of the claim's success. 317 When comparing Tables 2 and 3,
it can be seen that the portion awarded of partial awards is on
average nearly the same for income-based calculations as for claim
for expectation damages and the same for sunk·cost calculation and
reliance damages. The same applies to the ratio of claims awarded
in full and at nil.31B
Table 4 supports the finding of this correlation.
TABLE 4: TRIBUNAL'S VALUATION APPROACH PER
MEASURE OF DAMAGES CLAJMED
Measure of Damages

Tribunal's valuation*
Sunk cost
Market·based
Asset·based
Income-based

TOTAL

Reliance
Damages

Expectatwn
Damages

Restitutwn
Gains

Punitive
Damages

141 (83%)

27 (30%)

2 (50%)

2 (67%)

6(4%)

8 (9%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

7 (4%)

3(3%)

0 (5%)

0 (0%)

16 (9%)

53 (58%)

2 (50%)

1 (33%)

170 (100%)

91 (100%)

4 (100%)

3 (100%)

* Number of claims and percentage of all claims per valuation approach split

Table 4 lists the number times the tribunal calculated each
of four measures of damages using which of four different valuation methods. The data indicate that tribunals tend to value claims
See supra Table 3.
See supra Table 3.
317 See supra Table 2; supra Table 3.
818 See supra Table 2; supra Table 3.
315

816
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for expectation damages through income-based calculations and
claims for reliance damages using a sunk-cost approach. The table
shows that tribunals use a sunk-cost method to calculate 83% of
the claims for reliance damages and 9% through an income approach.319 They also calculate expectation losses taking the income
approach 58% of the time and 30% with sunk-cost calculations. 320
These findings substantiate the previously mentioned hypothesis
that an income-based valuation approach measure of damages is
more likely to be used to calculate expectation damages and the
sunk-costs approach for reliance damages.a21
At the same time, it is not surprising that the correlation
between valuation methods and the measure of damages is not
perfect. Not all claims for expectation losses will be valued using
income-based calculation methods. In case of claims for expectation damages, calculating the actual incurred costs-a sunk-cost
approach-may present a more reliable alternative if a reliable
estimation of future profits is challenging to make due to a lack
of trading history and thus an insufficient degree of historic profits
to find the net present value. 322 Equally, claims for reliance damages might sometimes be calculated by taking a forward-looking
method, such as an income-based approach, to prevent double
counting.323 That approach might be needed when the arbitrator
must calculate the historical investments or incurred costs to deduct this number from the amount of expectation damages if the
claimant would also have incurred those losses if the other party
had not breached the contract. 324
See supra Table 4.
See supra Table 4.
821 See supra Section I.A.
322 See Gervase MacGregor et al., Overview of Damages and Accounting
Basics, in GUIDE TO DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 157, 162 (John
s19

320

A. Trenor ed., 2018).
323 See id.
824 See Jan Paulsson, The Expectation Model, in EVALUATION OF DAMAGES
IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 57, 63 (Yves Derains & Richard H. Kreindler
eds., 2015) (observing that international arbitration tribunals may begin assessing the damages with determining the damnum emergens, such that the
lucrum cessans is only awarded if there is evidence that these profits would be
higher than the sunk costs); id. at 65 r'Since those revenues are fully accounted
for in the DCF going-concern evaluation, an award of lost investment as well
would be an unacceptable double recovery.... [W]hen the victim of a breach of
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The data presented so far do not prove that the measure
of damages or the method for calculating the quantum causally
affect the success of a claim for damages. 325 They only suggest a
degree of correlation. For this correlation to be more convincing,
the study eliminates another factor of possible significance: the
law.326 AB discussed, the measure of damages is generally perceived to present a question of the law.327 Moreover, compensation of the expectation damages is considered to be the primary
remedy in common law jurisdictions but not necessarily in civil
law jurisdictions. 328
Table 5 suggests that the success of a claim for damages
does not correlate with the legal culture connected to a case,
whether in the form of the laws that govern the contractual relationship, the arbitration laws at the seat of arbitration, or the
arbitrators' likely legal background.329
rontract seeks rerovery of sunken rosts, ronfident that it is entitled to its damnum,
it may go on to seek lost profits only with the proviso that its computations
reduce future net cash flows by allowing a proper measure of amortisation.'1;
Chappuis & Nessi, supra note 286, at 282; cf Amoco Int'l Fin. Corp. v. Iran,
15 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 189 (1987) (suggesting that using the DCF method
is a suitable method to calculate loss profits, hence, lucrum cessans, but not for
calculating the profitability as part of the going concern value, which it deemed a
matter of damnum emergens).
825 See infra Table 5.
326 See infra notes 327-28 and accompanying text.
827 Basic Am., Inc. v. Shatila, 992 P.2d 175, 194 (Idaho 1999).
828 Woss ET AL., supra note 16, at 4.127 ("However, reliance interest plays
only a modest role in US law filling in as an ascertainable measure when, for
whatever reason, the rourt refuses to award the full expectation interest.'1 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 342,
349 (Am. L. Inst. 1981) (which places an injured party's expectation interest
first and its reliance interest serond as "an alternative"); see also Connellan
et a!., supra note 302, at 20-21 (''While there are differences in the approach
to rompensatory damages in rommon and civil law jurisdictions, or among those
jurisdictions, they often lead to similar results, albeit through different paths.");
cf JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT
DoCTRINE 1 (1993) (observing, in general terms, that "[b]oth 'common law' systems ... and 'civil law systems' ... have a similar doctrinal structure based on
similar legal concepts'}
329 See infra Table 5. As the legal background of arbitrators is difficult to
trace, the study operationalized this category by taking the individual arbitrators' nationality as a proxy, even though a person may be educated or gained
critical work experience in a legal culture different than the one generally associated with nationality. Information about an arbitrator's nationality was
collected from the ICC Court's internal Case Agendas.
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TABLE 5: SUCCESS OF THE CLAIM PER LEGAL CULTURE
CONNECTED TO THE CASE
Legal Cultures
Connected jurisdictions*
Governing law
Lex arbitri
Background arbitrators

Common Law

Civil Law

Mixed

Other

54%

53%

52%

48%

56%

51%

54%

29%

56%

50%

60%

33%

• Percentage stands for the portion of partially awarded claims

In Table 5, lists the which average portion of the claimed
quantum that was awarded per legal culture to which the governing
law, lex arbitri, and the legal background of arbitrators belong. The
data shows that the success of claims, regardless of the measure of
damages or the calculation approach, does not vary depending on
cases connected to either common law or civil law jurisdictions.
Consequently, Tables 1 through 5 show that, while there
appears no significant relationship between the legal context and
the valuation of damages, the measure of the damages claimed
and the generally associated valuation approaches show some
correlation with the success of a damages claim. Therefore, the
resultant rule of regularity says that arbitrators are more likely
to award a higher percentage of the claimed quantum in case of
reliance damages than expectation damages regardless of whether
the dispute case is connected to civil law or common law.

2. The Number of Arbitrators
The second part of the case study concentrates on the tribunal's composition as a possible factor relevant for the success of
a claim for damages. 330 This aspect involves whether the success
of a claim for damages varies depending on the parties' preference
for a sole arbitrator or a three-person panel.331 Commentators
remark that parties often determine the number of arbitrators
in their arbitration agreement ex ante.aa2 The parties' freedom
See supra Table 5.
See infra Table 6.
882 BoRN, supra note 34, at 233 ("It is also common for international arbitration
agreements to address the number, means of appointment and qualifications
of the arbitrators.").
3ao
331
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to determine the number of arbitrators is generally endorsed by
both national arbitration laws and the procedural rules of the
major arbitration institutions including the ICC Court.333 However, sometimes opting for an even number is precluded.334 The
rule of thumb is that an uneven number of arbitrators is optimal
and that the choice is generally between one or three arbitrators.335
Existing surveys indicate that parties most often prefer
three-person panels over sole arbitrators. 336 A three-person panel
usually consists of two arbitrators appointed by either party and a
presiding arbitrator subsequently appointed by the two first arbitrators. 337 The preference for three arbitrators rather than one is
supported by statutory default rules such as national legislation,
or at least the UNCITRAL Model Law, which specifies that when
the parties have not determined the number of arbitrators, the
number of arbitrators will be three. 338 Then again, Article 12(2)
BoRN, supra note 34, at 1778 ("[A]rbitration legislation and judicial de·
cisions in most jurisdictions confirm the parties' freedom to select the arbitra·
tors .... The parties' autonomy includes the freedom to agree either on a specified
individual as arbitrator or on a procedure for selection of the arbitrator(s).'); see
CHINA INT'L ECON. & TRADE ARB. COMM'N, ARB. RULES art. 25 (2015) [herein·
after CIETAC] (number of arbitrators); H.K. INT'L ARB. CTR., ADMINISTERED
ARB. RULES art. 6(1) (2018) [hereinafter HKIAC] (number of arbitrators); ICC
ARB RULES, art. 12 (2021) (constitution of the arbitral tribunal); INT'L CTR.
FOR DISP. RESOL., INT'L DISP. RESOL. PROCEDURES, art. 12 (number of arbitra·
tors) (2021) [hereinafter ICDR]; SING. INT'L ARB. CTR., ARB. RULES, rule 9
(2016) [hereinafter SIAC] (number and appointment of arbitrators); VIENNA
INT'L ARBITRAL CTR., RULES OF ARB. AND MEDIATION art. 17 (2021) [hereinaf·
ter VIAC] (constitution of the arbitral tribunal).
884 BORN, supra note 34, at 1665; BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 162, at 18
("Parties to an arbitration are masters of the arbitral process to an extent
impossible in proceedings in a court oflaw.'}
885 BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 162, at 97 ~'In an international arbitration,
there should be an uneven number of arbitrators, and it is suggested that, in
general, three at most will be sufficient.').
336 2010 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY, supra note 191, at 25 ("73%
of respondents have a general preference as to the number of arbitrators, of
which 87% prefer three arbitrators.').
337 U.N. CoMM'N ON INT'L TRADE L., MODEL LAW ON INT'L COMM. ARB. art.
11(3)(a) (2006) (stating that when the parties have not agreed on a selection proce·
dure in case of panel of three arbitrators, "each party shall appoint one arbi ·
trator, and the two arbitrators thus appointed shall appoint the third arbitrator').
••• Id. at art. 10(2).
333
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of the ICC Rules takes a slightly different approach.339 It specifies that when the disputes have not decided either a sole arbitrator or a panel of three arbitrators, "the Court shall appoint a
sole arbitrator, save where it appears to the Court that the dispute is such as to warrant the appointment of three arbitrators."340
If parties agree to arbitrate their difference ex ante using the
ICC Court without further qualifications as to the procedure,
Article 12(2) will be applicable.341
The relevant literature lists various advantages and disadvantages of opting for a three-person panel over a sole arbitrator. It is said that choosing three arbitrators results in a higher total
of fees, travel, and accommodation expenses. The choice may also
increase the chance that the interaction between the arbitrators
delays the procedure. On the other hand, having a three-person
panel might also reduce the risk in complex cases that the panel
makes mistakes.342 The more considerable the amount in dispute,
it appears, the more likely that the parties would opt for a threeperson panel rather than a sole arbitrator.343 Another reason to
opt for a panel is that the parties can influence the composition
by appointing one of the arbitrators.344 The outcome might also
889

INT'L CHAMBER COM., ARBITRATION RULES art. 12(2) (2021).

Id.
341 See id.
342 See, e.g., BORN, supra note 34, at 1792--94 (arguing that while sole arbi340

trators tend to cost less and are better capable of responding quickly, the benefits
of a three-person panel in terms of expertise and diligence, often offset the added
costs); BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 162, at 237-39; Maria Angelica Burgos, The
Fear of the Sole Arbitrator, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Aug. 7, 2018), http://arbitration
blog.kluwerarbitration.com/2018/08/07/the-fear-of-the-sole-arbitrator/ [https:/1
perma.cc/NP2K-SAMR]; Ben Giaretta & Akshay Kishore, One Arbitrator or
Three?, AsHuRsT (Sept. 1, 2015), https://www.ashurst.com/enlnews-and-insights
/legal-updates/one-arbitrator-or-three/ [https://perma.cc/HA7Y-AQNM]; John
P. DiBlasi, The Commercial Arbitration: The Single Arbitrator Versus the TriPanel, NAT'LARB. & MEDIATION (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.namadr.com/pub
lications/the-commercial-arbitration-the-single-arbitrator-versus-the-tri-panel/
[https://perma.cc/THH2-KMLY].
343 See Burgos, supra note 342 (citing a study by the London Court of International Arbitration, which reported that the median amount in dispute in
cases decided by three-person panels are about five times greater than in those
decided by a sole arbitrator).
844 See BORN, supra note 34, at 1794--95; Burgos, supra note 342.
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turn out more balanced than a sole arbitrator's decision, partly
because a panel possibly brings more diverse expertise and background to the table. 345 On the other hand, the presiding arbitrators may assume a leadership position, setting the agenda and
driving the panel's point of view. 346 Commentators have concluded
that, while perhaps there exists no ideal number of arbitrators, 347
it is preferable or current practice to choose a three-person panel
for complex or high-stake cases and a sole arbitrator for cases
that are more straightforward and involve a smaller amount in
dispute348 or, if the value of such conflict is not apparent beforehand, to leave the matter undecided until a dispute arises. 349
Contemporary commentary has not addressed the possible impact of the parties' choice for either a three-person panel
or a sole arbitrator on the success of a claim for damages.aso Table 6 provides more insight on this matter.

345 See 2010 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY, supra note 191, at 25;
DiBlasi, supra note 342; BORN, supra note 34, at 1793.
345 See Giaretta & Kishore, supra note 342.
347 See, e.g., BORN, supra note 34, at 1802 (arguing that while "[t]here is no
such thing as the optimum number of arbitrators," an even number of arbitrators is bound to lead to "deadlock and uncertainty" while a panel of five or
more arbitrators is ''usually cumbersome and unnecessary").
348 See 2010 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY, supra note 191, at 25.
349 See Giaretta & Kishore, supra note 342.
850 See supra notes 332-64 and accompanying text (noting various advantages and disadvantages of using a single or multiple arbitrators, but not
the resulting impact on the success of a claim for damages).
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TABLE

6: TRIBUNAL COMPOSITION: SUCCESS OF CLAIM AND
VALUATION APPROACH
Composition Tribunal

Success of claim
Ave. amount in dispute (USD)
Awarded partially (percentage)*

Awarded in full (number of claims)
Awarded at nil (number of claims)
Valuation approach
Sunk cost
Market-based
Asset·based
Income-based

TOTAL

Sole Arbitrator

Three-Person Panel

36,066,395
61%
82
12

176,511,153
49%
159
31

57 (64%)
4 (4%)
4(4%)
24 (27%)
89 (100%)

123 (65%)
10 (5%)
6 (3%)
49 (26%)
188 (100%)

* Percentages showing portion of claimed quantum that was awarded on average

Table 6 compares both the success of the claims for damages and the valuation methods used to calculate the quantum
between cases decided by sole arbitrators and those by panels
consisting of three arbitrators. The data corroborate the previously mentioned thesis offered in the relevant literature, namely
that parties tend to opt for a sole arbitrator instead of a threeperson panel based on the amount in the dispute. 351 Table 6 shows,
the average amount in dispute for sole arbitrators ($36,066,395)
is nearly five times lower than the one for three-person panels
($176,511,153).
AI; to the claim's success, the data suggests a significant
correlation between the number of arbitrators and the percentage of the claimed quantum they tend to award.352 AI; Table 6
shows, there is little difference between the times sole arbitrators and three-person panels awarded a claim in full and at nil.
The percentage of claims awarded in full for sole arbitrators is
See, e.g., Burgos, supra note 342 (citing a study by the London Court of
International Arbitration, which reported that the median amount in dispute
in cases decided by three-person panels are about five times greater than in
those decided by a sole arbitrator); 2010 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
SURVEY, supra note 191, at 25.
••• See supra Table 6.
861
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87% (82 claims) and those at nil is 13% (12 claims),353 while for
three-person panels, the results are 84% (159 claims) and 16%
(31 claims), respectively. 354 However, a notable difference appears
in the remaining cases where a portion of the claimed quantum
was awarded: the average percentage of the claim awarded by
sole arbitrators was 61%, while three-person panels would award
an average of 49%. This difference suggests that the tribunal's
composition correlates with the success of a claim for damages: a
three-person panel appears more likely to award a greater portion of the claimed quantum than a sole arbitrator.355
The difference between sole arbitrators and three-person
panels in relation to a claim's success does not appear to be associated with the valuation methods used.356 Table 6 illustrates
that sole arbitrators use the income, asset, market, and sunk costs
approach as often as three-person panels do. Hence, the different
success rates of claims in relation to the number of arbitrators
could corroborate commentators' previously discussed observation that a three-person panel might yield more balanced decisions, but that more balanced or evenhanded decisions may also
negatively affect a claim's success.a57
In sum, a claimant might be better off opting for a sole
arbitrator as these tend to award a higher quantum of damages
than a three-person arbitration panel.35B Hence, the resulting
••• See supra Table 6.
364 See supra Table 6.
••• See supra Table 6.
366 See supra Table 6.
357 See, e.g., 2010 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SURVEY, supra note 191, at
25; DiBlasi, supra note 342. It is a possibility that the lower success rate is
not caused by the number of arbitrators but rather by a so-called confounding
variable-i.e., a variable affecting both a dependent and independent variable. In this instance, the value of the claim could be such a confounding variable. The reason is that Table 6 shows that the amount in dispute in cases
decided by sole arbitrators is sigoificantly lower than that in cases with threeperson panels. Hence, the amount in dispute might explain both the parties'
preference for the composition of tribunal, and the success rate of the claim.
However, a regression analysis not included in Table 6 does not show any sig·
nificant correlation between the amount in dispute and the percentage of the
claim awarded (R-squared = 0.0484). Hence, the value of the claim does not
appear to be a confounding variable.
••• See supra Table 6.
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rule of regularity says that sole arbitrators are more likely to
award a higher percentage of the claimed quantum than threeperson panels.

3. Engaging a Quantum Expert
The case study's third and final factor under review pertains to the hiring or appointment of quantum experts, in other
words, experts on valuing the claim for damages. A quantum
expert gives testimony to its observation involving a question of
fact as a knowledgeable and, in that sense, credible piece of evidence.359 The parties engaging a quantum expert can thus hope
to build a damages case and argue that case before the tribunal.aso However, involving an expert is not necessarily beneficial
for the claimant's case.as1 Even if appointed by one of the parties, quantum experts should come to an impartial conclusion
based on the case's facts and the applicable methods.as2 The task
at hand is to aid the tribunal in deciding the quantum as impartial, informed, and exact as possible.363
Commentators point out that relevant considerations for
the parties when retaining a quantum expert include asking if
the amount in dispute is worth the expense, if the complexity of
the damages issue necessitates an outside professional's expertise, or if the arbitrators are sufficiently experienced in valuation
questions.364 One author points out that the circumstance that
359 Ray Beyond Corp. v. Trimaran Fund Mgmt., LLC, No. CV 2018-0497KSJM, 2019 WL 366614, at *6 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 2019) (describing a typical
expert's authority, at least that of the expert in this case, as limited to "discrete factual issues within an independent accountant's expertise'} That the
role of a quantum expert, in principle, is not that of an umpire, does not mean
that parties cannot opt for the resolution of their dispute through an expert determination, for example in price-adjustment disputes after a merger or acquisition. See AMY C. KLAsENER, GUIDE TO M&AARBITRATION 78--79 (2d ed. 2019).
360 Trenor, supra note 16, at 137.
861 See John Jones, More Than a Simple Question of Quantum? A Cautwnary
Guide to Expert Evidence, HKA (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.hka.com/quan
tum -cautionary-expert-evidence/ [https://perma.cc/DR5J-BFHW].
362

Id.

See Trenor, supra note 16, at 154; Richard Boulton & Amit Arora, The
Functwn and Role of Damages Experts, in GUIDE TO DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 128, 129--30 (John A. Trenor ed., 2018).
864 See Trenor, supra note 16, at 137.
363
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the other party has or likely will engage a quantum expert may
also play a role. ass It might not be necessary to hire an expert just
because the other party has done so. 366 Hiring a quantum expert
might even suggest to the arbitrators confidence in one's case
when not engaging an expert.a67
As presented in Table 7, the case study's data suggest that
the question of whether involving a quantum expert is beneficial
for a party's case is not as straightforward as it may seem.
TABLE 7: SUCCESS OF THE CLAIM AND THE ENGAGEMENT OF
QUANTUM EXPERT
Engagement Expert

Expert Engaged

No Expert Engaged

The success of the claim*
Claimant's expert

49%

58%

Tribunal-appointed expert

43%

53%

* Percentages showing portion of claimed quantum that was awarded on average
Table 7 compares the portion of the claimed quantum that
was awarded in cases where the claimant engaged, or the tribunal appointed a quantum expert with cases in which they did
not. On the first impression, the data might cause surprise because it suggests involving an expert might hurt a claimant's case.
The data shows that the claimant risks getting awarded nine
points less by hiring a quantum expert than if it does not involve
one. Similarly, when the tribunal itself appoints a quantum expert, the average percentage of the claim awarded turns out to
43%, ten points lower than when the tribunal does not do so. 368
Hence, on its face, it appears best for the claimant not to recommend the tribunal appoint a quantum expert.
However, on closer inspection, Table 8 shows that the advantage for claimant of engaging a quantum expert depends in
part on whether the respondent decides to do so as well.

365 Id .
... Id.
367 Id.
868 See supra Table 7.
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TABLE 8: PARTIES ENGAGING QUANTUM EXPERTS
AND THE CLAIM'S SUCCESS

Success claim*

Only claimant
engages expert

Neither party
engages expert

Both parties
engage experts

65%

56%

41%

* Percentages showing portion of claimed quantum that was awarded on average

Table 8 compares the average portion of the claimed damages awarded by the Tribunal in cases where only claimant engaged a quantum expert, where neither claimant nor respondent
did, and where both parties involved an expert. The data suggests
that when only the claimant and the respondent also involve an
expert, the average percentage of the requested quantum is nearly
65%. When the respondent also seeks an expert, however, that
number goes down with almost twenty-five points to 41%. 369 When
neither party engages a quantum expert, the claimant fairs better,
with, on average, a percentage awarded of 56%.370 Still, that is
about nine points lower than when only the claimant has a quantum expert.371 For the respondent, it appears most beneficial to
engage a quantum expert.372 Therefore, while using a quantum
expert might seem advantageous to the claimant's case, the data
signifies that the advantage depends significantly on whether the
respondent also engages a quantum expert. 373
In sum, the third category of findings suggests that the
engagement of quantum experts is of significance for the success of
a claim for damages: the advantage of engaging a quantum expert
depends on whether the other party's actions in that regard.374 The
subsequent rule of regularity expresses that engaging a quantum
See supra Table 8.
See supra Table 8.
371 See supra Table 8. The data further shows that when only the respondent uses a quantum expert, the average percentage of the claim awarded is
seventy-frix percent, a signjficantly higher percentage than when only tlte claimant
uses an expert. However, because this situation only occurred in respect to a
mere ten claims of the data pool, the low significance of this number does not
merit further examination of this otherwise surprising result.
872 See supra Table 8.
373 See supra Table 8.
874 See supra Section III.C; supra notes 117-25.
869
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expert is likely more beneficial for the claimant if the respondent does not appoint an expert, but the least helpful when both
parties do.

D. Implications: Contracting Out of Rules of Regularity
As announced at the outset of Part III, the quantitative
analyses presented here yield one substantive and two procedural
rules of arbitral regularity.375 By disclosing these findings, this
case study enables future transactors to decide whether to tacitly
accept these rules of regularity by abstaining from addressing these
issues or, instead, agree to alternative terms to avoid or minimize the possibility of these arbitral decision-making patterns
taking place in dispute resolution.a7s
As mentioned, the first substantive law default generated
by the study holds that, unless parties agree otherwise, arbitrators are more likely to award a higher percentage of the amount
claimed in cases of reliance damages than expectation damages
regardless of whether the dispute case is connected to civil law
or common law.377 In response to this rule of regularity, parties
could decide to negotiate for a liquidated damages clause that
could counter arbitrators' hesitance to accept forward-looking
valuation techniques that calculate expectation damages such as
lost profits.37B Hence, when negotiating the contract, the parties
best consider the measure of damages for the losses each might
suffer in case of a breach by the other party. 379 For example, depending on the contractual relationship, one party might be the
victim of late or nonperformance, while the other of late or nonpayment.aso When a party predicts its expectation interest will
be at stake, it might be advisable to negotiate for a liquidated
damages clause with a well-devised, forward-looking formula for
calculating expected future losses. 381
See supra Section liLA.
See supra Sections III.B-III.C; supra notes 86--111 and accompanying text.
377 See supra Section liLA.
378 See Rational Bargaining Theory, supra note 66, at 793.
379 Id.
880 Cf. id.
381 See, e.g., How Does Discounted Case Flow (DCF) Analysis Work?, supra
note 278.
875

376
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The second procedural rule of regularity says that, unless
parties agree otherwise, sole arbitrators are more likely to award a
higher percentage of the claimed quantum than three-person
panels. 382 In response to these fmdings, future contracting parties could negotiate the number of arbitrators ex ante before any
dispute has arisen or ex post. 383 Such an arrangement could supply more security for both parties if it cannot be said, ex ante, who
would be a claimant in a future dispute or if both parties filed a
claim, whose claimed losses would be higher.384 On the other hand,
if a party wishes to avoid the tribunal's composition ending up at
their disadvantage, it might look to omit the number of arbitrators from the arbitration clause ex ante and, instead, make a proposal in the Request for Arbitration or its Response-depending
on who will be the claimant and who will be the respondent.385
The latter strategy could be more beneficial to the party who
prefers a sole arbitrator if the arbitration institution where the
dispute is pending appoints a sole arbitrator by default in cases
where the parties cannot reach an agreement. 386
Lastly, the other procedural rule of regularity entailed
engaging a quantum expert is likely more advantageous for the
claimant if the respondent does not appoint an expert, but the
least helpful to claimant when both parties do.387 Parties would
unlikely contract out of such default procedural rules ex ante.388
Suppose parties wish to contract out of a possible situation where
engaging quantum experts turns out disadvantageous. In that
case, they can negotiate expert evidence's admissibility at the
outset of the arbitral procedure, in the first procedural order, or
during the case management conference if applicable. 389 Here,
this rule of regularity suggests that the claimant would prefer
See supra Section liLA.
See BoRN, supra note 34, at 233.
384 See supra Section IILC.
885 See supra Section IILC; BORN, supra note 34, at 233.
388 See, e.g., 2021 Rules of Arbitration, supra note 243 ("Where the parties
have not agreed upon the number of arbitrators, the Court shall appoint a
sole arbitrator, save where it appears to the Court that the dispute is such as
to warrant the appointment of three arbitrators.'1.
887 See supra Section liLA.
388 See supra Section liLA.
889 See, e.g., 2021 Rules of Arbitration, supra note 243.
382

383
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being the only party to appoint a quantum expert or, if the other
party resists, try to opt for both parties to refrain from engaging
quantum experts.39o
By offering future transactors an opportunity to consider
these kinds of patterns of arbitral decision-making through empiricallegal research, the ensuing rules of regularity gained perform a similar function to default rules, which also empower
transactors to simply accept or incur the costs of making alternative arrangements. 391
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This Article's proposed empirical method can help commercial
arbitration's current practice mitigate the lack of predictability of
arbitral decision-making.392 In this way, publicly available empirical studies of arbitral awards can enhance the parties' autonomy
and the efficiency of their contract, just as default rules do. 393
Studies like these thus bring the practice of commercial arbitration closer to becoming the autonomy and efficiency-enhancing
alternative to litigation that underlies the Supreme Court's interpretation and application of the FAA.394
However, more empirical research is needed to develop a
comprehensive and varied set of rules of regularity to effectuate
this progress. For example, a larger dataset and more elaborate
statistical analyses could capture higher-order co-occurrences between combined variables without reducing the resulting data
points and thus decreasing the significance of the inferential
statistical fmdings. Moreover, empirical legal scholarship can
increase autonomy and efficiency further with comparative studies of arbitral and judicial decision-making. Such research can
help contrast the benefits and downsides of arbitration compared
to litigation and help future transactors and their attorneys decide
whether to include an arbitration clause in their contract or opt
for litigation instead.
See supra Section III. C.
See Correspondence of Contract, supra note 66, at 1631.
892 See supra Introduction.
393 See supra Section I.C; supra Section liLA.
894 See supra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
390
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In closing, a growing comprehensive scholarly body of empirical knowledge of arbitral decision-making could, over time,
prompt arbitrators to deliberately follow the established practices
from past arbitral decisions and thus develop a practice of arbitral stare decisis. Rules of regularity will then have brought about
genuine arbitral default rules.

